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Access to Meaningful Remedy:
Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in
Tort Litigation Against Domestic
Violence Offenders
Batterers are given systemic immunity in the legal system.  It’s
systemic because there is an unwillingness to accept the litiga-
tion of torts in the midst of a divorce proceeding.1
—Michigan Judge Bill Callahan
Domestic violence2 victims may currently file tort actionsagainst their abusers, couched as assault and battery, stalk-
ing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud,3
among others.  Despite the fact that such remedies are desirable
under legal and compensation frameworks, battered women have
not generally used these options.  Domestic violence victims have
dramatically underutilized tort law, with at least three doctrinal
obstacles thwarting its use:  the courts’ reluctance to interfere in
marriages, the assumption that existing laws adequately regulate
divorce, and the primacy of statutes of limitation.
* B.A., cum laude,  Harvard Extension School; J.D., cum laude,  Harvard Law
School; Clinical Professor, University of Texas School of Law; former domestic vio-
lence and juvenile prosecutor, and advocate since 1977.  The author wishes to thank
colleagues Professors John Dzienkowski, Douglas Laycock, Shelby Moore, and Jay
Westbrook, and Chief Norm Stamper for their editing and suggestions, and Univer-
sity of Texas law students Melissa Jacobs, Kathryn Ritcheske, and Jesse Zamprano
for their research assistance.
1 Diana Diggs, Lawyers Join Domestic Violence Torts to Divorce Judgments, Judge
Leads Quiet Revolution to Educate Family Lawyers , LAW. WKLY. USA, Feb. 19,
2001, at B3.
2 “Domestic violence” occurs when one intimate partner uses physical violence,
threats, stalking, harassment, or emotional or financial abuse to control, manipulate,
coerce, or intimidate the other partner. See  Roberta Valente, Domestic Violence
and the Law , in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE:
A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK 1-3 to 1-4 (1996).
3 See infra  notes 57-64 and accompanying text for broader discussion of range of
potential intentional torts.
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Legal doctrine must be reformed to diminish the dangerous
and unfair results experienced by too many abuse survivors who
turn to the courts for help.  After reviewing cultural norms and
discussing the doctrinal obstacles, I argue for recognition of a
new tort of domestic violence to afford abuse victims increased
access to the panoply of remedies to which they are entitled.  As
an administratively feasible option, the tort of domestic violence
reflects the same call for specialization as for medical malprac-
tice, toxic torts, products liability, and mass torts.  Recognizing a
tort of domestic violence also provides a normative basis for re-
forming the doctrinal obstacles that needlessly interfere with the
right of battered women to seek redress for their harms.4
In Part I, I address cultural norms of tort litigation in the con-
text of domestic violence, attempting to explain the dearth of
cases.  But a more nuanced evaluation is required, as some vic-
tims are deterred by the combination of aversion to prolonged
divorce litigation and gendered socialization about naming, com-
pensation, and redress.  Doctrinal obstacles further deter poten-
tial plaintiffs.  Geography, race, religion, and, understandably,
socioeconomic status impact usage of tort against batterers as
well.
Recognition of the full spectrum of abuse is essential to under-
standing some victims’ reticence, but also to pierce the minimiza-
tion veil that still shrouds intimate partner violence.  I argue that
acculturated non-empathy for abuse victims is a factor in deter-
ring domestic violence tort actions, with selective concern and
the illusion of neutrality prevalent in court decisions.  Religious
doctrine, particularly that of the conservative Christian move-
4 Although there are also battered men, they are a miniscule minority of the cases,
and I will thus use the terms “battered women” and “abuse victims” interchangea-
bly. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AND AGE OF VICTIM, 1993-99, at 3 (Bureau of Just. Stat. Special Rep.
NCJ 187635, Oct. 2001) (“Women were victimized in 85% of the 791,210 intimate
partner violent crimes in 1999.”), available at  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/
ipva99.htm; see also PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 17 (2000) (noting data that
women are significantly more likely than men to report being the victims of intimate
partner violence); Russel Dobash et al., The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital
Violence , 39 SOC. PROBS. 71, 74-75 (1992) (documenting that empirical data prove
that females constitute the vast majority of domestic violence victims); Phyllis Gold-
farb, Describing Without Circumscribing:  Questioning the Construction of Gender in
the Discourse on Intimate Violence , 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996) (noting that
domestic violence discourse has largely focused on male batterers and female
victims).
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ment, has also shaped law and policy relating to violence within
the family.
Part II covers the doctrinal obstacle presented by courts’ con-
sistent reluctance to interfere in marriages, even those involving
family violence.  A brief discussion of privacy doctrine leads,
with pro and con stances on the optimal combination of state
versus individual determinant of court intervention; this in turn
frames the pivotal issue of designing a judicially manageable
threshold that allows harmed victims access to domestic violence
tort remedies, while not flooding the courts with minor marital
grievances.  Here, I speak to the failure of no-fault divorce when
domestic violence has occurred, fueled by the premise that any
determination of fault, and certainly tort actions, are suspect in
dissolution matters.  Also troublesome is that divorce law, to the
extent that it recognizes physical abuse as problematic, has gen-
erally been loathe to compensate for economic and psychological
abuse—although empirical studies indicate they can be just as
devastating to the victims as physical abuse.
In Part III, I discuss a second doctrinal obstacle, the presump-
tion that existing family law is sufficient, with an examination of
the failure of no-fault doctrine in the rubric of domestic violence.
I then turn to permissive versus mandatory joinder of tort claims,
arguing that every state should allow permissive joinder to en-
able victims to determine when their cases should be filed, based
on considerations of safety, autonomy, access to competent legal
counsel, and ability to withstand protracted litigation.  In the
next subsection, disproportional distribution of the marital estate
is discussed as an inadequate means of even minimal compensa-
tion.  I reference the dearth of prenuptial agreements protecting
abuse victims, and critique some courts’ convoluted reasoning
that allowing tort actions contributes to animus within intimate
relationships.
Part IV directly tackles statutes of limitations doctrinal issues,
primarily focusing on the need for continuing tort doctrine to be
applied uniformly in domestic violence cases where a pattern of
harm has occurred over time.  In Part V, I make the case for
domestic violence to be designated as its own tort, arguing that
the power of taxonomy be utilized to confer title to the array of
classic torts committed under the rubric of intimate partner
abuse.  A brief discussion of legislative remedies follows.  I then
cover remedial proposals for collecting tort judgments, ranging
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from inclusion with the alimony order to amending the bank-
ruptcy code to prevent dischargeability of tort damages awards.
My suggestions are intended to address the dearth of attention
paid to critical issues regarding the scope of lawyer and judicial
intervention, timing of sanctions, awarding of damages, and re-
moval of doctrinal obstacles.
Intentional torts require a legal regime that affords predictable
remedies for the victims, a framework that will facilitate torts’
deterrence function while avoiding a minefield of perverse incen-
tives that currently sabotage many criminal justice efforts to curb
domestic violence.  Although liability should clearly be predi-
cated on proof of the batterer’s intentional, harmful conduct,
scant attention has been paid to firmly entrenched doctrinal ob-
stacles that must be removed if abuse victims are to benefit from
the progress toward equitable resolutions in tort.
Battered women are crime victims who suffer physical, psycho-
logical, sexual, and financial harms.  The current legal system
does not begin to provide compensation, restitution, or funds for
survivors to return to normalcy, as it focuses on terminating the
marriage;5 division of property; and child custody, visitation, and
support.  This Article provides the means by which small changes
in torts practice, easily accomplished through court and legisla-
tive advocacy, could remedy many of its present failings.  Such
reforms are much needed and are consistent with the principles
of tort.  It is furthermore completely theoretically and jurispru-
dentially accurate to use tort law in redress for domestic violence
harms.
I
CULTURAL NORMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORT LITIGATION
A. Use of Tort as a Domestic Violence6 Remedy
Tort laws’ purposes are at least fivefold:  corrective justice,7
5 This Article will focus primarily on utilization of tort within the realm of divorce;
however, most of the theory, arguments, and recommendations apply equally in
cases of unmarried abuse victims seeking compensation for their harm.
6 Although the criminal law definition of domestic violence is typically limited to
physical or sexual assault or threats in civil law, and torts in particular, psychological
abuse is also considered within the rubric of domestic violence. See infra  Part I.A.2.
discussing the full spectrum of abuse.  I will interchangeably use the terms domestic
violence, domestic abuse, partner abuse, intimate partner abuse, and spousal assault
to refer to the inclusive definition as described herein.
7 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14 (1997).
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optimal deterrence,8 loss distribution,9 compensation,10 and re-
dress for social grievances.11  Although these doctrines seem to
fit the facts in the vast majority of partner abuse cases, rarely are
they argued on behalf of even severely harmed spouses.  The po-
lemics of tort litigation raise the normative question: in which
genres of law should intimate partner violence be addressed?
Some battered women attempting to have the perpetrators
prosecuted for clear violations of criminal statutes find the state
unwilling to treat their cases as serious, violent crime.12  Instead,
victims may be referred to family court, perpetuating the archaic
notion that domestic violence is a private family matter to be re-
solved as a relationship dispute.13  But family law is largely pre-
mised on the belief that only minimal state intervention is
warranted absent the most egregious, near-fatal conduct, with
the greatest emphasis on no-fault divorce as the means to expedi-
tious resolution of the cases.14  Dropped at the doorstep of tort
law, battered spouses face the prospect of too-brief statutes of
limitations, confusing joinder mandates, and difficulty in collect-
ing judgments.15  It makes sense that criminal, family, and tort
law be employed, as case facts warrant, in reforming policy and
practice in domestic violence cases.
1. Why the Dearth of Cases?
One would assume that any potentially lucrative area of per-
sonal injury law would be taught, studied, practiced, reported,
and an integral part of the scholarly discourse on torts.  Yet rela-
tive to other areas of tort, sparse case law and literature exist on
the topic of domestic violence,16 in spite of its damages potential
8 Id . at 15.
9 Id . at 16.
10 Id . at 18.
11 Id . at 19.
12 See, e.g. , 2003 ILL. LAWS 416 (“WHEREAS, Recent national studies demon-
strate that women in the United States continue to be greatly harmed by gender-
related violence such as domestic violence, which is disproportionately visited upon
women by men, and sexual abuse, which harms many women and children without
being reported or prosecuted. . .”) (for full preamble, see infra  note 448 and accom-
panying text).
13 See infra  Part II.
14 See id .
15 See infra  Parts III, IV, and V.
16 Some notable exceptions include:  Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic
Torts and Divorce:  Constraints and Possibilities , 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319 (1997);
Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts , 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121 (2001).
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and the deleterious impact on direct victims,17 children witness-
ing the abuse,18 and the greater community.19  It is understanda-
ble that few abuse victims initiate discussion with their divorce
lawyers about tort actions,20 simply because most have no knowl-
edge of this option.  They also may be unaware of their status as
abuse victims,21 or fear retaliation from the batterer for disclos-
ing the harm.22  But given that the majority of women suing for
divorce claim domestic violence as a precipitating factor,23 it is
puzzling that family law practitioners do not file tort actions
more frequently.  In some cases, the client is more interested in
gaining custody of her children and remaining safe; thus she is
unwilling to risk antagonizing the batterer with additional legal
claims.24  Most lawyers and judges are not familiar with the basic
dynamics of domestic violence relationships, and thus have no
concept of the heightened psychological, verbal, financial, and
physical abuse typically suffered by abuse victims.25  That being
said, courts are gradually acknowledging the need to compensate
17 See, e.g. , Caroline M. Clements et al., Dysphoria and Hopelessness Following
Battering:  The Role of Perceived Control, Coping and Self-Esteem , 19 J. OF FAM.
VIOLENCE 25 (2004) (citing empirical data documenting that increased physical mor-
tality and morbidity, depression, and low self-esteem are but a few of the many
consequences of domestic abuse).
18 See, e.g. , Joanne G. Cummings et al., Behavior Problems in Children Exposed
to Wife Abuse:  Gender Differences , 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 133-56 (1999) (describing
the adverse influence of simply witnessing abuse, but also the trauma of being
harmed while trying to protect an abused mother).
19 Intimate partner violence costs businesses an estimated $3-5 billion per year in
absenteeism, higher insurance costs, employee turnovers, and lost productivity. See
Centers for Disease Control Intimate Partner Violence Report, available at
www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv-cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf.
20 See  Dalton, supra  note 17, at 395 n.20.  (“Among approximately 2600 reported R
state cases of battery, assault, or both, from 1981 through 1990, only fifty-three in-
volved adult parties in domestic relationships.”).
21 See  Barbara Glesner Fines, Joinder of Tort Claims in Divorce Actions , 12 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 285, 301-02 (1994).
22 See  Dalton, supra  note 17, at 364-71. R
23 See  Brennan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667, 675 (N.J. 1996) (citing Linda L. Ammons,
Discretionary Justice:  A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor’s Use of the Clem-
ency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women , 3 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (1994)).
24 See  Dalton, supra  note 17, at 364-71. R
25 Since 1977, I have been a battered women’s advocate in Colorado, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, New York, Texas, and Washington (as a shelter advocate,
paralegal, and then prosecutor).  For the past fifteen years, I have also provided
much training and technical assistance to courts and community domestic violence
programs in every state, served on the boards of national, state, and local family
violence entities, and continue to regularly research, write, and speak on these is-
sues.  My cumulative experiences are reflected throughout the Article.
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spouses for intentional harms inflicted during the marriage.26
Additionally, there are exemplary judges and lawyers who have
educated themselves thoroughly on family violence matters and
implemented model programs that transformed victim and of-
fender interventions.27
Many attorneys falsely believe that the collectible damages will
be insufficient to make tort suits worthwhile, based on their as-
sumption that most batterers are middle or low-income.28  Some
empirical studies have documented the prevalence of domestic
violence across all income strata, with similar levels of frequency
and severity,29 although others indicate a higher incidence among
low-income couples.30  High-income victims tend not to avail
themselves of public services such as police, courts, or shelters,
instead suffering in silence.31  Wealthy battered women also face
abusers with the means to relentlessly stalk and trace them.  Be-
cause the batterer often controls all finances of the couple, the
victim may have no access to the funds needed to flee unless she
can access public assistance.32  However, the couple may possess
substantial assets, some of which have likely been hidden from
26 See, e.g. , In re  Marriage of Moore, 890 S.W.2d 821, 828 (Tex. App. 1994) (stat-
ing that in the context of divorce, a spouse may recover for intentional torts commit-
ted during the marriage).
27 For further information on model programs and promising practices, see  Na-
tional Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, www.ncjfcj.org, 1-800-52-
PEACE; Battered Women’s Justice Project, 1-800-903-0111.
28 See, e.g. , Heather Lauren Hughes, Contradictions, Open Secrets and Feminist
Faith in Enlightenment , 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 190 n.10 (2002) (stating
that one explanation for the low number of tort suits against batterers could be the
belief that these cases provide inadequate incentive due to minimal potential
damages).
29 See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 18-19 (1979) (finding that
upper income women were beaten just as often and severely as low-income victims).
30 The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that women with an annual income
under $7,500 have substantially higher rates of violence by an intimate partner (e.g.,
22.5 per 1,000 as compared to 12.5 per 1,000 in the $7,500 to $14,999 bracket); see
also  Angela M. Moore, Intimate Violence:  Does Socioeconomic Status Matter? , in
VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATE PARTNERS 90 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997) (dis-
cussing the disproportionate incidence of domestic violence among low-income
groups).
31 See, e.g. , Hillary Johnson & Francine G. Hermeün, The Truth About White-
Collar Domestic Violence , WORKING WOMAN, Mar. 1, 1995, at 54 (reporting that
“for a vast number of middle- or upper-class women, many of them professionals,
domestic violence is a secret, usually silent affair”).
32 See  Noël Bridget Busch & Terry A. Wolfer, Battered Women Speak Out, Wel-
fare Reform and Their Decisions to Disclose , 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 566, 567
(2002) (stating that many battered women use welfare as a means to get out of a
violent relationship).
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the victim, which the lawyer may access for her fees and for dam-
ages in a tort action.33  Overall, however, the impoverished state
of many low-income victims makes their ability to escape from
the abuse and retain counsel all the more difficult.34
Lawyers handle a wide range of cases for which there may not
be a multi-million dollar award, and with domestic violence tort
actions there is still much room to both garner an equitable set-
tlement for an abuse victim and collect a profitable fee.  For ex-
ample, a Maine attorney reports that in one domestic violence
case the victim was able to obtain a settlement of $25,000, over
and above her share of the marital estate.35  A Virginia lawyer
obtained a $50,000 judgment on behalf of a battered woman
whose husband had pistol-whipped her.36  Increasingly, albeit at
a frustratingly sluggish pace, some victims are successfully suing
their abusers as well as negligent third parties.  In 2003, a Massa-
chusetts superior court awarded $9 million to a battered woman
left paralyzed by her former boyfriend.37  Tanya Underhill filed
the tort suit after Paul Rathbun broke her neck as he wrenched
her from a car at the Eastover Resort in 2000.  Rathbun is now
serving a fifteen-to-twenty year sentence for the assault, thus
minimizing the likelihood that Ms. Underhill will ever receive
her award.  Although it refused to disclose the details of the set-
tlement, the Eastover Resort earlier settled the case Underhill
brought against it for $500,000.38  It is not the purpose of this
Article to address tort litigation against culpable third parties,
33 See, e.g. , Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App. 1984).  The trial court submit-
ted the issue of fraud against the community as a separate action in tort for fraud,
for which the jury found the husband guilty and awarded the wife actual damages,
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
34 See, e.g. , Stacey L. Williams & Kristin D. Mickelson, The Nexus of Domestic
Violence and Poverty , 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 283, 289 (2004) (reporting
that low-income women have heightened anxiety and low self-esteem in the after-
math of abuse, in part due to lack of support and the inability to obtain the resources
that could buffer them).
35 E-mail from Judith A. Plano, attorney in Bangor, Maine (Feb. 2, 2004) (on file
with author).
36 E-mail from Charles Hofheimer, attorney (Feb. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
The case was heard in Chesapeake Virginia circuit court, with Thomas Shuttleworth
and Charles Hofheimer as co-counsel for the Plaintiff.  Attorney Hofheimer states
that because there was no insurance, the client settled the judgment for significantly
less without consulting counsel.
37 Domestic Violence Victim Awarded $9 Million Dollars , Dec. 14, 2003, at  http://
www.wmnbfm.com/news.php3?story_id=5197 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
38 Id .
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but counsel is ethically bound to investigate this option and ad-
vise clients of possible causes of action.
Those few attorneys who have handled domestic violence tort
actions often express a general distaste for these cases, based in
large part on their aversion to the grievous nature of the bat-
terer’s conduct.  Several women lawyers with whom I spoke con-
fided personal fear of the batterers.  One had her office
destroyed the night after a case (involving a wealthy doctor who
had brutally assaulted his eight-months-pregnant wife) settled for
$3 million.39  Blame for the dearth of tort cases as redress for
domestic abuse cannot be laid only at the doorstep of unin-
formed or fearful lawyers, for legislators and judges are stake-
holders in the symbiotic process of maintaining the status quo.
The underutilization of tort as a remedy for abuse victims reflects
cultural norms based on a combination of aversion to prolonged
divorce litigation and gendered socialization about naming, com-
pensation, and redress.
Naming relates to many of the privacy concerns discussed
herein; that is, not wanting to publicly air personal relationship
problems.  This trepidation is particularly acute for women of
color, who often feel the added pressure of not wanting to con-
tribute to the litany of existing negative stereotypes about their
people.40  Lesbian and gay victims report the same reluctance to
not further demonize homosexual relationships, but also that
they may pay too high a price for being “outed”:  rejection by
family, loss of job, and condemnation by their church commu-
39 Although colleagues have encouraged this lawyer to file charges against the
batterer, he is a prominent Houston physician and she is sufficiently concerned for
her continued safety to have decided not to handle any more domestic violence mat-
ters.  At this point, she is speaking on the condition of anonymity.
40 See  Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery
and Stereotypes:  The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome ,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1024-25:
The loyalty trap affects the ability of black women to seek protection and
effective counseling.  For example, African-American women do not feel
comfortable discussing their problems in integrated settings.  The fear is
that disclosure in some way may hurt the community.  Therefore the [cul-
tural] prohibition against airing dirty laundry becomes more important
than healing.  Emma Jordan Coleman describes the dilemma abused black
women face as a “Hobbesian choice between claiming individual protec-
tion as a member of her gender and race or contributing to the collective
stigma upon her race if she decides to report the misdeeds of a black man
to white authority figures.
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nity.41  Self-esteem is highly correlated with whether one feels
worthy of compensation and redress.  Since survivors often expe-
rience low self-worth and blame themselves for their abuse, it
may be hard for them to conceptualize themselves as deserving
any legal remedies, let alone monetary damages.
Geography, race, culture, religion, and socioeconomic status
further impact usage of the legal system,42 and specifically, filing
tort claims against batterers.  Some battered women are forced to
stay with abusive partners for economic reasons, as coping with
such trauma exacerbates their financial woes by making it more
difficult to find and maintain employment.43  Although research-
ers report finding a higher incidence of domestic violence against
African-American women, Professor Amy Farmer argues that
this is almost wholly tied to their level of education being less
than that of white women, and thus the greater likelihood of be-
ing low-income.44  She notes that after controlling the data for
the variables of income, level of education, living in the South,
and having children under twelve, white women were more often
battered than Hispanic or African-American women.45  Impor-
tantly, Professor Farmer emphasizes that it is a victim’s ability to
earn a living, as opposed to simply family income, that creates
greater opportunity for her to leave.46  Since many batterers pre-
vent their partners from getting higher education or technical
41 See  Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence:  Claiming a Domestic
Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes , 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325,
331 (1999); Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Justice:  Equal Protection for Victims of Same-
Sex Domestic Violence , 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335 (1995); see also VIOLENCE IN GAY
AND LESBIAN DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (Claire M. Renzetti & Charles Harvey Mi-
ley eds., 1996); Patrick Letellier, Gay and Bisexual Male Domestic Violence Victimi-
zation:  Challenges to Feminist Theory and Responses to Violence , 9 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 95 (1994); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises:  Intra-Lesbian Violence,
Law and Lesbian Legal Theory , 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990).
42 See, e.g. , Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:  Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color , 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
43 See, e.g. , Williams & Mickelson, supra  note 34 at 289; see also  Martha F. Davis,
The Economics of Abuse:  How Violence Perpetuates Women’s Poverty , in BAT-
TERED WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM 17 (Ruth A. Brandweir ed.,
1999).
44 UA Researcher Cites Legal Aid, Age For Less Abuse of Women , THE COMMER-
CIAL APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Nov. 30, 2002, at B5 (reporting that while Farmer’s
research initially found that African American women were 35% more likely to be
abused, it is necessary to control for income, education, children under twelve, and
living in the South to gain a more accurate picture of racial implications), available
at  2002 WL 102832863.
45 Id .
46 Id .
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training, such interference should be included in damages calcu-
lations.  Fortunately, most abuse victims eventually escape the
abuse,47 but whether they are able to rebuild safe and meaningful
lives may depend on finding a competent lawyer who can help
protect them from the perpetrator,48 including securing the fi-
nancial remuneration to which they are entitled.
Women from families and cultures that revere traditional, pa-
triarchal49 social norms are also less apt to identify maltreatment
as abuse, and are highly unlikely to report the harm to a lawyer,
doctor, the court, or police.  This is particularly so for immi-
grants, those for whom English is not their first language or who
do not speak it at all,50 and for isolated women of color.51  Gen-
der analysis loses a critical dimension without addressing how
race and racism influence the incidence of domestic violence and
the legal system’s response.  The dearth of tort cases either
within or subsequent to divorces may also reflect the reality that
most family law matters are not reported or appealed.
2. Recognition of the Full Spectrum of Abuse
Doctrinal obstacles mute the scope and severity  of physical,
47 See  Desmond Ellis & Walter S. DeKeseredy, Rethinking Estrangement, Inter-
ventions and Intimate Femicide , 3 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 590 (1997).
48 See supra note 44 (reporting findings that access to legal services is the greatest
predictor of women achieving safety).
49 Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s widely accepted definition of patriarchy is
that of justifying male domination over women.  Catherine A. MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method, and the State:  Toward Feminist Jurisprudence , 8 SIGNS:  J.
WOM. CULTURE & SOC’Y 635 (1983).
50 See, e.g. , Farah Ahmad et al., Patriarchal Beliefs and Perceptions of Abuse
Among South Asian Immigrant Women , 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 262 (2004)
(reporting their study finding that women who agreed with patriarchal social norms
were less likely to identify physical battery as spouse abuse, and almost half of the
women in the study did not know they could discuss abuse concerns with medical
providers); see generally MARGARET ABRAHAM, SPEAKING THE UNSPEAKABLE
(2000); A.D. Kulwicki and J. Miller, Domestic Abuse in the Arab American Popula-
tion: Transforming Environmental Conditions Through Community Education , 20
ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 199-215 (1999); Anita Sharma, Healing the
Wounds of Domestic Abuse:  Improving the Effectiveness of Feminist Therapeutic In-
terventions With Immigrant and Racially Visible Women Who Have Been Abused , 7
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1405 (2001).
51 See  Shelby A.D. Moore, Understanding the Connection Between Domestic Vio-
lence, Crime, and Poverty:  How Welfare Reform May Keep Battered Women from
Leaving Abusive Relationships , 12 TEXAS J. WOM. & L. 451 (2003); see also BETH E.
RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME 2 (1996) (stating that “[t]he extent to which some
women experience this predicament [domestic violence] is directly related to the
degree of stigma, isolation, and marginalization imposed by their social position”).
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sexual, psychological, and economic abuse often perpetrated
against women in intimate relationships.52  Although those sub-
jected to one type of victimization are likely also to be exposed
to other forms,53 most legal and medical providers do not rou-
tinely screen for multiple permutations of abuse.54  Intimate part-
ner violence is characterized by intentional harms to persons and
their property for which the victims should be compensated.55
Such harms encompass the traditional torts of assault,56 battery,57
harassment, stalking,58 false imprisonment,59 intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress,60 trespass to land, fraud,61 and conver-
52 See, e.g. , Shannon-Lee Meyer et al., Men’s Sexual Aggression in Marriage , 4
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 415 (1998) (finding that while all forms of abuse are
underreported, sexual violence is typically not acknowledged unless specifically in-
cluded in screening); see also PATRICIA EVANS, THE VERBALLY ABUSIVE RELA-
TIONSHIP 42-50 (1992) (discussing the adverse consequences of verbal abuse).
53 See, e.g. , Victoria M. Follette et al., Cumulative Trauma:  The Impact of Child
Sexual Abuse, Adult Sexual Assault, and Spouse Abuse , 9 J. OF TRAUMATIC STRESS
25 (1996) (stating that data indicate a high co-incidence of various forms of abuse);
see also  Heidi S. Resnick et al., Prevalence of Civilian Trauma and Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder in a Representative National Sample of Women , 61 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 984 (1993).
54 See  Jeannine Monnier et al., Patterns of Assault in a Sample of Recent Rape
Victims , 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 585, 593 (2002) (finding in their study that
60% of rape victims had previously suffered sexual assault, 49% experienced prior
physical assaults, and 17% reported physical abuse after the last rape).
55 See, e.g. , In re  Matter of Marriage of Moore, 890 S.W.2d 821, 828 (Tex. App.
1994) (stating that in the context of divorce, a spouse may recover for intentional
torts committed during the marriage).
56 See, e.g. , Hogenson v. Williams, 542 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. App. 1976) (defining
a tortious civil assault as one in which a person intentionally, knowingly, or reck-
lessly causes bodily injury to another).
57 Assault and battery herein refers not only to the stereotypical punches, kicks,
and other forms of physical abuse, but also to the sexual assault frequently co-occur-
ring in long-term, violent relationships. See  Angela Browne, Violence Against Wo-
men By Male Partners , 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1077 (1993) (reporting that women
battered by intimate partners also experienced a high incidence of sexual assault).
58 See, e.g. , Megan Rhyne, Spying Spouse May Be Guilty of Stalking , NAT’L L. J.,
Feb. 17, 2003, at B1 (citing H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309 (2003)) (describing the
ruling that a husband’s secret videotaping of his wife’s bedroom likely constitutes
stalking and harassment).
59 See, e.g. , Deleon v. Hernandez, 814 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App. 1991) (wife sought
civil damages for false imprisonment).
60 See infra  notes 208-18 and accompanying text for examples of IIED cases.
61 Marital fraud includes misrepresentations that are acted upon and cause harm,
also constituting breach of the fiduciary duties that spouses owe each other. See,
e.g. , In re  Marriage of Murray, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 356 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3294 as permitting punitive damages when fraud is committed);
see also  Vickery v. Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342, 357 (Tex. 1999) (affirming that spouses
are bound by the fiduciary duties in handling the community estate).
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sion,62 but often as multiple violations, with the added
component of incessant fear.63
The term “separation violence” was coined to describe the all
too common abuse that the batterer inflicts after the victim has
fled.64  Feeling that he is losing control of her, the batterer may
escalate the violence,65 and even murder his partner.66  It is thus
irresponsible and unethical to give a battered client the simplistic
advice to leave, without preparing a safety plan.67  Absent a
short- and long-term safety plan, the victim is placed in the un-
tenable position of having to placate a volatile batterer, while si-
multaneously trying to secure legal remedies, achieve financial
independence, and secure safety for herself and her children.
In preparing an individualized safety plan, counsel should
carefully inquire about the degree to which the client has been
subjected to sexual abuse in addition to physical battery.  Recent
studies have documented that sexually sadistic men are more
62 See, e.g. , Eskine v. Eskine, 428 So.2d 1194 (La. App. 1983) (permitting wife to
sue husband for tortious conversion).
63 See  Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the
Violence:  Women’s Experiences of Violence by Former Partners , 6 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1363 (2000) (reporting that in their research, more than one third
of the women who participated in their longitudinal study were assaulted by a male
ex-partner during a two-year time period).
64 See RENNISON, supra  note 5, at 5 (finding that separated females are victimized R
more often than married, divorced, widowed, or never-married women).
65 Dana Raigrodski, Consent Engendered:  A Feminist Critique of Consensual
Fourth Amendment Searches , 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 53 (2004) (describing
separation abuse as exposing “women to increased violence when they try to leave);
see also  Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering:
A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence , 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 1005
n.229 (2004) (discussing separation assault).
66 See CONSTANCE A. BEAN, WOMEN MURDERED BY THE MEN THEY LOVED
(1992); see also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1986); Carolyn
Rebecca Block & Antigone Christakos, Intimate Partner Homicide in Chicago over
29 Years , 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 496, 526 (1995); Aysan Sev’er, Recent or Imminent
Separation and Intimate Violence Against Women:  A Conceptual Overview and
Some Canadian Examples , 3 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 566 (1997); Margo I. Wil-
son & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in Spousal Killings?  On the Exceptional Sex
Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the United States , 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 215 (1992).
67 Even if the battered client has already left her abuser, counsel should ensure
she has a safety plan in place.  A safety plan is a well organized action plan to assist
the victim in staying alive that addresses the varied circumstances of the victim.  A
safety plan brochure is available for download from the website of the American
Bar Association.  Safety Tips for You and Your Family, Am. Bar Ass’n, at  http://
abanet.org/tips/publicservice/safetipseng.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).  The
safety plans are intentionally not copyrighted to encourage their replication and dis-
tribution. See  Sarah M. Buel, Safety Planning Begins with You , TEX. PROSECUTOR,
Sept. 1996, at 21.
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likely to inflict severe physical abuse, sometimes even murdering
their partners.68  Additionally, studies indicate that batterers who
are sexually sadistic toward adult partners are also far more
likely to perpetrate incest against their own children.69  Similar to
the “morally indiscriminate” child molester, the sexually sadistic
offender often exploits any vulnerable, available victim.70  These
findings indicate that when counsel determines that a sexual sad-
ist has victimized her client, she should explore the possibility
that child sexual abuse is also present, and if applicable, explore
tort remedies on the child’s behalf.
A common tactic of batterers going through divorce proceed-
ings is to claim that the victims are either mutually combative or
the sole aggressors.  Although there exist a small minority of wo-
men who initiate abuse, experts warn that most often it is the
male who perpetrates the violence.71  Professor Jeffrey Edelson,
researcher and expert in family violence, further asserts that the
myth of women as equally violent is politically motivated back-
lash intended to intimidate true victims.72  An isolated incident
often does not accurately reflect who is the true victim and who
is the abuser.  Domestic violence is a planned pattern  of abuse
that reflects the perpetrator’s belief that he is entitled to use vio-
lence if his partner is not sufficiently solicitous, obedient, loyal,
or compliant.73
Even this simplified insight into the dynamics of battering can
help lawyers and judges understand that mutual battering is ex-
traordinarily rare:  a domestic violence relationship is typified by
68 See  Janet I. Warren & Robert R. Hazelwood, Relational Patterns Associated
with Sexual Sadism:  A Study of 20 Wives and Girlfriends , 17 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 75,
80 (2002) (stating that sadistic men are likely to inflict many forms of severe physical
abuse, including murdering people other than their partners, sometimes with the
help of their partners), available at  http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0885-7482/
contents; see also  Park Elliot Dietz et al., The Sexually Sadistic Criminal and His
Offenses , 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163 (1990).
69 Warren & Hazelwood, supra  note 69, at 267. R
70 Id . at 267-68.
71 See Jeffrey L. Edleson, Fact & Fantasy:  Violent Women:  Social Service Agen-
cies Have a Responsibility to Know the Difference , DOMESTIC ABUSE PROJECT
TRAINING & RESEARCH UPDATE, June 1998, available at  http://
www.mincava.umn.edu/papers/jeffdap.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
72 Id .  Professor Edleson suggests utilizing NANCIE HAMLETT & CAROL J. FRICK,
WOMEN WHO ABUSE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998), to better assess women
and their stories of abuse.
73 David Adams, Treatment Programs for Batterers , 5 CLINICS FAM. PRAC. 159
(2003).
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a persistent batterer and a designated victim.74  A survivor’s use
of force in response to certain situations does not make her a
batterer.  It is the perpetrator who employs terroristic conduct—
physical, psychological, sexual, financial, and individualized
abuse—to solidify control of his partner.75  Both during and after
the divorce, the offender often tenaciously continues his pattern
of abuse in whatever manner the court and police allow.  If the
court takes victim safety seriously and enforces protective orders,
the batterer may resort to more covert tactics, such that he is still
able to terrify the victim, but her pleas for help are viewed as
exaggerated, neurotic, paranoid, or unwarranted.76
Perhaps “separation abuse” would be more accurate, as batter-
ers may stop the physical assaults, but continue harassment, psy-
chological and economic coercion, and any other behavior
designed to retain control of their victims.  Judges and juries may
minimize psychological abuse if counsel does not adequately ed-
ucate them about compelling empirical data documenting the
grievous harm it confers, whether or not there are evident physi-
cal manifestations.77  Batterers frequently sabotage victims’ ef-
forts to seek and maintain employment,78 causing tardiness,
absenteeism, and harassment that may result in the women being
fired.79  When they are able to work outside the home, victims
are often denied access to their own earnings as well as those of
74 See id .; Linda C. Neilson, Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in Child Cus-
tody and Access Cases , 42 FAM. CT. REV. 411, 420 (2004) (noting that batterer’s
claims of mutual abuse are typical in family abuse cases).
75 Neilson, supra  note 75, at 417-18. R
76 Note that no-fault does allow for consideration of misconduct in determining
child custody. See, e.g. , Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Ky. 1973)
(quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 403.110:  “This chapter shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to: . . . (3) Mitigate the
potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal disso-
lution of marriage.”)
77 See, e.g. , Bruce D. Perry & John Marcellus, The Impact of Abuse and Neglect
on the Developing Brain , available at  http://teacher.scholastic.com/professional/
bruceperry/abuse_neglect.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).  When children are ex-
posed to domestic violence or physically abused themselves, their neurodevelop-
ment is stunted by having to remain in a state of fear-related activation during the
traumatic experience.
78 Shelly Kinzel, Comment, The Effects of Domestic Violence on Welfare Reform:
An Assessment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act as Applied to Battered Women , 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 593 (2002).
79 See  Jody Raphael, Keeping Women Poor:  How Domestic Violence Prevents Wo-
men from Leaving Welfare and Entering the World of Work , in BATTERED WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM 31 (Ruth A. Brandwein ed., 1999).
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their partners.80  Thus, not only do separation and divorce not
solve the problem of abuse,81 but they may, in fact, operate to
sufficiently deter the victim from filing tort claims or taking other
legal action to obtain remedies.  The full spectrum of abuse re-
minds the victim of her batterer’s potential for violence, effec-
tively intimidating many victims desiring just compensation.  It is
incumbent upon counsel to include all of the economic and psy-
chological abuse suffered by the survivor in calculating both
compensatory and punitive damages.
Given the frequency of intimidation and harm committed by
batterers after  separation and during dissolution proceedings,
counsel should advise her client that every state prohibits witness
tampering once a criminal case has been reported.82  Whether or
not a battered client is concomitantly pursuing a criminal case
against the perpetrator, counsel should use the terminology, defi-
nitions, and intent evidenced in witness tampering statutes when
presenting the tort claim.  For example, in most states these ob-
struction laws are considered felony level offenses in recognition
of the likelihood of the perpetrator’s success:  many victims and
witnesses are deterred from continuing participation in the crimi-
nal matter precisely because they fear the offender’s retalia-
tion.83  Counsel will also want to advise his client that offering
any financial inducement also constitutes obstruction of justice84
as the sophisticated batterer may proffer jewelry, cash, or other
tempting goods rather than threaten further violence.  Even stat-
utes that do not specifically provide for such bribes have general
language that covers seemingly innocuous offers that serve the
80 Kinzel, supra note 79, at 593. R
81 Eve Buzawa et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Response to Domestic Violence in a
Pro-Active Court Setting:  Executive Summary  (1999).
82 See, e.g. , ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.540 (Michie 2004) (tampering with a witness in
the first degree); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.22 (West 2004) (tampering with a witness,
victim, or informant); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 268, § 13B (West 2004) (intimida-
tion of witnesses, jurors and persons furnishing information in connection with crim-
inal proceedings); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.10 (McKinney 2004) (tampering with a
witness in the fourth degree); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06 (Vernon 2004) (ob-
struction or retaliation).
83 See, e.g. , ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.540 (tampering with a witness in the first de-
gree is a class C felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.22 (tampering with a witness, victim,
or informant constitutes a third degree felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06
(obstruction or retaliation is a third degree felony).
84 See, e.g. , MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 268 § 13B, which states that, “Whoever,
directly or indirectly, willfully endeavors by means of a gift, offer or promise of
anything of value. . . to influence, impede, obstruct, delay or otherwise interfere with
any witness. . . shall be punished.”
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same function as threats or violence.85
Importantly, some jurisdictions do not limit their witness pro-
tections to those involved solely in criminal cases.  Florida’s stat-
ute provides that a person cannot use physical force, threats, or
offer of financial gain with the intent to cause the witness to de-
cline participation in an official investigation or official proceed-
ing.86  New York offers similar protection by referencing “an
action or proceeding,”87 and Alaska cites “an official proceeding;
or . . . judicial proceeding to which the witness has been sum-
moned.”88  By not limiting their purview to criminal cases,
Alaska, Florida, and New York have given family law attorneys
and their clients another vehicle through which they can hold
batterers responsible for the true scope of their abuse.  Witness
tampering is arguably the single most frequent offense commit-
ted against domestic violence victims, yet the least prosecuted in
spite of its deleterious impact on the victim’s ability to seek legal
remedies.
B. Acculturated Non-Empathy for Abuse Victims
Continued antipathy toward domestic violence survivors helps
explain the persistence of doctrinal obstacles to their accessing
well-established tort remedies.  Some feminist analysis would at-
tribute the impediments to the legal system’s patriarchal power
structure that perpetuates social norms of male domination.
Postmodern feminists, however, would argue for a more nuanced
approach, as there are varying levels of antagonism exhibited to-
ward battered women depending on their race, culture, socio-ec-
onomic status, sexual orientation, ability to speak English, and
connections within the court system.
1. Selective Empathy and the Illusion of Neutrality
Selective empathy is inexorably predicated on the values of the
judges, lawyers, and other stakeholders89 involved in domestic vi-
85 See, e.g. , ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.56.540(a) (“A person commits the crime of
tampering with a witness in the first degree if the person knowingly induces or at-
tempts to induce a witness to (1) testify falsely, offer misleading testimony in an
official proceeding. . . .”)
86 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.22 (1)(a).
87 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.10.
88 ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.540(1), (2).
89 Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW 6 (Susan A. Bandes
ed., 1999).
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olence cases.  Attempting to rationally dissect such cases leads
many jurists to incorrectly analyze the framework of abuse, and
thus dissociate from the victims.90  In one essay, Judge Richard
Posner states that the law must remain neutral regarding emo-
tions unless they serve a legal purpose, such as in evaluating heat
of passion crimes.91  He cites curbing dangerous activity as the
goal of criminal law, noting that in most crimes of passion the
victim has provoked the perpetrator.92  This simplistic generaliza-
tion reflects an extraordinary ignorance of the dynamics of do-
mestic violence relationships.  For at least three decades,
batterer’s treatment experts have asserted that abuse is a choice ;
it is a planned pattern of coercive control that is predicated not
on the victim’s behavior, but on the perpetrator’s willingness to
use violence to achieve his ends.93  By attributing all or much of
the blame to the victim, legal professionals can more easily justify
relegating domestic violence matters to a low priority.
Particularly relevant is that domestic violence is also highly
gendered, with females far more frequently victimized by male
perpetrators than the reverse.94  When asked by a reporter if he
thought there were just as many battered men as battered wo-
men, former Dallas Police Detective Steve Storrie responded, “If
that was true, those domestic violence shelters would have valet
parking in the front and golf courses in the back.  We wouldn’t
stand for how badly battered women get treated by the sys-
tem.”95  But not all law enforcement officers have the compas-
sion and courage of Detective Storrie.  Former Seattle Police
Chief Norm Stamper writes, “One detective, unburdened by sen-
sitivity, told me, ‘You spend your days handing Kleenexes to
some sobbing broad whose old man gave her what she de-
90 See, e.g., Mary Becker, The Passions of Battered Women:  Cognitive Links Be-
tween Passion, Empathy, and Power , 8 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 1 (2001).
91 Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law , in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW, supra  note 89, at 309, 312.
92 Id .
93 See, e.g. , Adams, supra  note 73, at 163; Hamish Sinclair, A Community Activist
Response to Intimate Partner Violence , in PROGRAMS FOR MEN WHO BATTER
(Etiony Aldarondo & Fernando Mederos eds., 2002) 5/1; Peter G. Jaffe & Robert
Geffner, Child Custody Disputes and Domestic Violence:  Critical Issues for Mental
Health, Social Service, and Legal Professionals , in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL
VIOLENCE 371 (George W. Holden et al. eds., 1998).
94 RENNISON, supra  note 5. R
95 Statement made in the author’s presence on February 16, 2000 in Dallas, Texas.
Det. Storrie is a twenty-five-year veteran of the Dallas Police Department and the
Dallas County Criminal District Attorney’s Office.
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served.’”96  Understandably, when battered women have en-
countered such antipathy, they are not likely to have much
confidence that the legal system will be of assistance.
Especially troubling is the pervasiveness of overt and subtle
victim blaming that permeates our culture, even these many de-
cades after heightened awareness of domestic violence and sex-
ual assault.  Former Colorado State Senator Joyce Lawrence, co-
chair of a panel to examine the recent University of Colorado
football team’s sexual assault and harassment scandals, com-
mented, “The question I have for the ladies in this is, Why are
they going to parties like this and drinking or taking drugs and
putting themselves in a very threatening position like this?”97
Her response begs the question:  “So, in spite of state laws to the
contrary, women who attend college parties or consume alcohol
or drugs have essentially given pre-consent to be raped?”  Rape
shield laws were intended to direct attention away from whether
the victim was a “good girl,” and correctly toward whether an
unlawful sexual assault had occurred.  Indeed, although three
victims at the University of Colorado were at college parties
when sexually assaulted by either football players or recruits, CU
placekicker Katie Hnida reported being raped by a teammate
when watching television on a summer evening.98  Oklahoma
athletic director Joe Castiglione advises, “[W]e need to step back
and look at the culture that exists on our campuses.”99  But atti-
tudes of entitlement are not limited to football players, nor is
protection for perpetrators restricted to universities.
Professor Walter DeKeseredy, a noted researcher in the field
of violence against women, found that most studies on marital
rape focus only on what occurred during cohabitation, although
there is substantial evidence that batterers are likely to increase
sexual assaults of their partners after  separation.100  In a recent
study, Martin D. Schwartz and Professor DeKeseredy asked par-
ticipants if they had experienced any of the following four types
96 NORM STAMPER, BREAKING RANKS:  A TOP COP’S STREET-SMART PLAN TO
MAKE AMERICA A SAFE PLACE – FOR EVERYONE 8 (2004).
97 Kelli Anderson & George Dohrmann, University of Colorado Recruiting Scan-
dal; Out of Control? , SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 23, 2004, at 69.
98 Rick Reilly, Another Victim at Colorado , SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 23, 2004,
at 80.
99 Anderson and Dohrmann, supra  note 98. R
100 See  Walter S. DeKeseredy et al., Separation/Divorce Sexual Assault:  The Cur-
rent State of Social Scientific Knowledge , 9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 675
(2004).
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of conduct:  (1) sexual contact,101 (2) sexual coercion,102 (3) at-
tempted rape,103 and (4) rape.104  Incredibly, of the separated or
divorced respondents, eighty percent  had been victims of rape,
twenty percent  victims of attempted rape, seventy-five percent  vic-
tims of sexual coercion, and sixty-five percent  victims of sexual
contact—with eighty percent having been subjected to more than
one type of sexual abuse.105  When asked about nonsexual types
of abuse perpetrated against them by former spouses, eighty-five
percent reported physical violence, ninety percent psychological
abuse, seventy percent economic abuse, ten percent abuse of
pets, forty percent stalking, and thirty percent destruction of
prized possessions.106  With empirical data documenting this level
of severe abuse, it is little wonder that many survivors and advo-
cates believe the continued victim blaming is intentional and sys-
temic preservation of the status quo, doggedly resisting
interference with men’s conduct in intimate relationships.107
Acculturated non-empathy for victims also involves the reality
that battered women may be allowed to speak to a police officer,
judge, or lawyer, but they are not heard .  For example, when one
female judge was asked what bothers her most about domestic
violence cases, she responded that she is furious with the women
who recant and ask for their protective orders to be rescinded
when it is clear they have been harmed.108  When it was ex-
101 Schwartz and DeKeseredy define sexual contact as “fondling, kissing, or pet-
ting . . . arising from menacing verbal pressure, misuse of authority, threats of harm,
or actual physical force.” MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ & WALTER S. DEKESEREDY, SEX-
UAL ASSAULT ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS 8 (1997).
102 Sexual coercion “includes unwanted sexual intercourse arising from the use of
menacing verbal pressure or the misuse of authority.” Id . at 9.
103 Attempted rape “includes attempted unwanted sexual intercourse arising from
the use of or threats of force, or the use of drugs or alcohol.” Id .
104 Rape is “unwanted sexual intercourse arising from the use of or threats of
force and other unwanted sexual intercourse arising from the use of or threats of
force and other unwanted sex acts (anal or oral intercourse or penetration by objects
other than the penis) arising from the use of or threat of force, or the use of drugs or
alcohol.” Id .
105 WALTER S. DEKESEREDY ET AL., SEPARATION/DIVORCE SEXUAL ASSAULT IN
RURAL OHIO:  THE CONTRIBUTION OF PATRIARCHAL MALE PEER SUPPORT 6 tbl.1
(2004), available at  http://www.andvsa.org/Walterrevised2004ascpaper.pdf.
106 Id . at 7 tbl.2.
107 See infra  Part II for elaboration on this doctrinal obstacle.
108 Each semester, we bring our law students in the Domestic Violence Clinic to
the local court for a tour and to meet some of the judges.  Since we continue to
practice before this judge, I will not use her name, but I feel compelled to note the
lack of empathy with the plight of the victim acting under duress.  Discussion was
held at the Travis County (TX.) Courthouse on September 10, 2002.
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plained that most victims requesting termination of the protec-
tive order are doing so under duress,109 the judge responded that
the women are disrespecting the court when they lie; that if the
abuse happened, they should retain the order.110  This position
reflects a profound lack of compassion for the position in which
many victims find themselves, that of trying to assess how to stay
alive in the face of the batterer’s threats and the court’s condem-
nation.  This judge assumes that by asking the victim why she
wishes to dismiss the protective order, she is engaging in a suffi-
cient colloquy to determine the true nature of the charges.  How-
ever, in most such situations the victim cannot tell the judge the
truth, that her husband said he would kill her if she retains the
protective order, proceeds with the divorce, or testifies in the
criminal case, as she will likely be harmed by the batterer for
revealing his witness tampering.111
This judge, and others of similar mindset, does not seem troub-
led by the habitual lying by batterers proclaiming innocence in
the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  The persis-
tence of victim blaming ignores the fact that but for the batterer’s
abusive conduct and threats, the victim would neither initially re-
quest the protective order nor be forced to rescind it under du-
ress.  Although some judges and lawyers who have an intellectual
understanding of a victim’s necessary recantation are not able to
translate that to an empathetic response, others do not even at-
tempt comprehension—making it easier to react with disdain.
Kentucky Judge Megan Lake Thornton ordered two battered
women to pay fines of one hundred to two hundred dollars for
making contact with their batterers against whom they had ob-
tained restraining orders.112  In spite of the fact that the re-
straining orders only mandate that the respondent batterer not
have contact with the victim, Judge Thornton proclaimed, “These
are orders of the court.  People are ordered to follow them, and I
don’t care which side you’re on.”113  The judge also ignored the
reality that in the aftermath of separation, it may be necessary to
109 The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides duress as a defense for one who en-
gages in criminal acts as a result of the use or threatened use of force to which a
reasonable person would have succumbed. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (2001).
110 Id .
111 I use the legal term intentionally, for it is a felony offense in most states to
threaten a witness in a pending litigation.
112 Francis X. Clines, Judge’s Domestic Violence Ruling Creates an Outcry in Ken-
tucky , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at A14.
113 Id .
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discuss issues regarding children, joint finances, and other house-
hold matters.  But even if contact were initiated by victims with-
out the need to discuss family questions, the judge’s response
ignores that most battered women blame themselves for the rela-
tionship conflicts—in part because batterers keep asserting this is
so and society affirms it.114  This judge’s response is also troub-
ling since the court has jurisdiction over the respondent, but not
the petitioner.
A Massachusetts battered woman, Cara Caraccio, describes
the judge presiding over her 2003 case as pressuring her to agree
to “irretrievable breakdown” as the basis for her divorce, in spite
of a lengthy history of severe abuse.115  Ms. Caraccio has been
trying to divorce her violent husband, Vinnie Caraccio, for sev-
eral years, but he has been successful at repeatedly blocking
completion of the divorce by persuading judges to grant addi-
tional continuances while he gets yet another lawyer.116  Two
days before the divorce trial, Vinnie Caraccio’s attorney was
granted permission to withdraw from the case as his client had
neither provided financial statements nor kept numerous ap-
pointments, thus postponing trial until late spring of 2004.  Cara
Caraccio had filed for divorce on the basis of her husband’s
“cruel and abusive treatment” because, she said, “He was mean
and abusive and violent and drank and used drugs and lied and
got into trouble and spent all our money and cheated on me.”117
Ms. Caraccio was still required to return to court on the trial date
to receive temporary divorce orders and be told to come back for
the trial in late spring—the same information she had received
three days previously.  However, she states that it is worth wait-
ing to have the divorce granted on the basis of his “cruel and
abusive” treatment of her, although she is understandably quite
frustrated that Vinnie seems to still be controlling the court’s
handling of their divorce, and the judge evidencing greater con-
cern for moving the case along than for her safety.118
Pressuring abuse victims to accept no-fault divorces also tells
114 See  Aurelio Jose Figueredo, Blame, Retribution and Deterrence Among Both
Survivors and Perpetrators of Male Violence Against Women , 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 219 (2000) (stating that the empirical data he has reviewed find that “self-blame is
the driving force behind distress among survivors of male violence”).
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them that the state believes it is more important to maintain the
illusion of minimal discord than to honestly recognize the true
nature of the horrific abuse they have suffered.  It is thus particu-
larly important to have tort remedies available to address domes-
tic violence, since the courts often do not want to officially
acknowledge the harm, let alone compensate the victim for it.
Pushing no-fault because it appears administratively more expe-
ditious is based on the faulty logic that the case should simply be
dealt with as quickly as possible.  However, if the batterer feels
that he has been successful in getting the court to view the mar-
riage through his lens of denial and minimization, there is a
greater likelihood that he will continue abusing his ex-spouse,
often by being overly litigious in requesting change of custody,
expanded visitation, decreased child support, and alleging that
she is harassing him.119  The overly litigious batterer makes the
court complicit in his abuse, but also creates much additional ad-
ministrative work, whether or not these matters reach trial.
In her request for a restraining order, Massachusetts battered
woman Pamela Nigro Dunn stated in the affidavit:  “I’m a pris-
oner in my apartment.  He locks me in and takes the phone cord
out.  He choked me and threatened to kill me if I try to leave.
He made me work only where he works . . . . My life is in danger
so long as he is around.”120
As a result, Somerville District Court Judge Paul Heffernan
ordered that her husband, Paul Dunn, was to have no contact
with her.121  At the final hearing twelve days later, Judge Heffer-
nan reprimanded Ms. Dunn for requesting a police officer escort
to retrieve her belongings from their apartment, admonishing her
to “act as an adult.”122  When a victim advocate from the District
Attorney’s Office tried to explain further egregious facts of the
case, Judge Heffernan told her:  “You don’t understand my point
of view worth one cent.  You heard me tell this lady that she
didn’t need the police.”123  This, although Paul Dunn had also
repeatedly beaten Ms. Dunn with an electrical cord, locked her
in a closet for hours on end, and assaulted her on numerous occa-
119 Adams, supra  note 74, at 162 (describing various forms of abuse, including R
economic control and harassment).
120 Joan Meier, Battered Justice , WASH. MONTHLY, May 1987, at 38.
121 Eileen McNamara, Judge Criticized After Woman’s Death , BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 21, 1986, at A1.
122 Id .
123 Id .
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sions.  To the police officer that corroborated the need for an
escort, the Judge responded:  “You’ve been duped in this case.  I
don’t mind saying so for the record.”124  With Paul Dunn present,
Judge Heffernan added:  “This is pretty trivial . . . .  This court
has a lot more serious matters to contend with.  We’re doing a
terrible disservice to the taxpayers here.  You want to gnaw on
her and she on you, fine, but let’s not do it at the taxpayer’s
expense.”125
Within five months of this hearing, Paul Dunn abducted Ms.
Dunn from a bus stop, then stabbed, strangled, and shot her,
leaving her face down in a pool of water at the Arlington
Dump.126  Ms. Dunn, just twenty-two years old, was five months
pregnant at the time of her killing, for which Paul Dunn was con-
victed of first-degree murder and given a life sentence without
parole.127  As I sat with Pamela Dunn’s parents at the sentencing
hearing, Paul Dunn’s mother walked by and said to them:  “Your
daughter got what she deserved; she was a bitch!”  And so the
cultural antipathy for abuse victims comes full circle.
Judges fuel the cynicism of abuse victims and their families
when they minimize or excuse domestic violence, for they are
refusing to uphold the law.  Professor James Ptacek argues that a
restraining or protective order represents a negotiation between
the battered woman and the state regarding how she will be pro-
tected from the perpetrator.128  By urging abuse victims to obtain
protective orders, the state is, in effect, offering a measure of ser-
vice on which the battered woman ought to be able to rely.  That
so many abuse victims face harsh treatment once they do seek
assistance bespeaks the gender bias still prevalent within our le-
gal system.
Most states define tortious civil assault as bodily injury com-
mitted with intent or recklessness,129 yet judges sometimes add
124 Id .
125 Meier, supra  note 120.
126 Eileen McNamara, Judge Is Viewed as Erring on Abuse Law, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 24, 1986, at Metro 1; Eileen McNamara, Dunn to Face Murder Charges on
Return to Mass Today , BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 1986 at A1; Eileen McNamara,
Two Judges Criticized in Review By Zoll , BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 1987, at A1.
127 Paul Langner, Dunn Given Life Term in Wife’s Slaying , BOSTON GLOBE, May
20, 1987, at A1.
128 JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM 8 (1999) (stating that
obtaining a restraining order is an interactive process between battered women and
judges over protection from abusive men).
129 See, e.g. , Hogenson v. Williams, 542 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. App. 1976) (stating
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their own standards with no legal basis.  In a Houston case, the
husband did not deny that he had punched his wife in the face
and body with his fist, but asserted a claim for summary judg-
ment on the basis that his wife had neither sought medical care
nor reported the assault to the police.130  Although the wife also
asserted a claim for false imprisonment, Harris County Judge Bill
Elliott granted summary judgment.131  Although the appellate
court reversed, finding that the wife’s lack of outreach to commu-
nity services did not legally defeat her causes of action,132 too
many such trial court rulings stand because victims lack the re-
sources or sound advice to appeal.  It can be argued that judges
simply reflect the lack of empathy for abuse victims within the
community, but judges’ authority and vast power invest in them a
greater responsibility not only to uphold the law and not sup-
plant their own biases, but also to shine as a beacon of reasona-
bleness and fair play.
2. Religious Doctrine’s Effect on Domestic Violence Legal
Practices
Religious doctrine greatly impacts the behavior of legal stake-
holders’ handling of domestic violence matters, reflective of cen-
turies of Judeo-Christian principles promoting patriarchy and
male superiority.133  At present, most churches do not officially
approve of domestic violence, but the problematic teachings of
women’s inferiority and duty to submit to their husbands persist,
and offer mixed messages to adherents.134  Just as in the courts,
some church counselors and clergy may feel that preserving the
family is more important than the individual concerns of a bat-
tered woman.135
a tortious civil assault is committed if a person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another).
130 DeLeon v. Hernandez, 814 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App. 1991).
131 Id .
132 Id . (ruling that summary judgment was improper, as the wife’s failure to ob-
tain medical treatment and report the crimes to the police did not negate her causes
of action for assault and false imprisonment as a matter of law).
133 See  Kathleen A. McDonald, Battered Wives, Religion, & Law:  An Interdisci-
plinary Approach , 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 251, 252 (1990) (noting that, although
quite different in some teachings, both Judaism and Christianity are male-centered
and share similar beliefs about the inferiority of women, including that God created
the patriarchal family).
134 Id .
135 See  Brenda V. Smith, Battering, Forgiveness, and Redemption , 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 921 (2003) (citing Katherine Hancock Ragsdale, The Role
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On February 6, 2004, the Spanish Roman Catholic Bishops
Conference released a treatise on the family in which they de-
clared that domestic violence, sexual abuse, and homeless chil-
dren are the “bitter fruit[s]” of sexual liberation.136  Although the
leading Spanish newspaper called the bishops’ position “ludi-
crous,”137 the treatise is noteworthy for its stark denial of the
church’s failure to intervene appropriately in most cases of vio-
lence against women.  Lest it be assumed that this perspective is
held only by bishops in Spain, similar views are found among
clerics of many faiths in America.  Research documents that do-
mestic violence victims often turn first to their churches for help,
but that, overwhelmingly, they find support lacking from that
source, with victim-blaming common.138  Too often clergy advise
battered women to alter their behavior to be more compliant,
rather than addressing the importance of the batterer’s ceasing
his conduct.139  To their credit, the Bishops of the United States
stated in their pastoral response to domestic violence that “[a]s
bishops, we condemn the use of the Bible to condone abusive
behavior.  A correct reading of the Scriptures leads people to a
relationship based on mutuality and love.”140  One problem is
that such documents, however progressive, do not appear to be
translating to more respectful treatment of abuse victims at the
parish level.  Battered women who divorce their husbands often
report great guilt and self-blame based on their understanding of
of Religious Institutions in Responding to the Domestic Violence Crisis , 58 ALB. L.
REV. 1149, 1156 (1995) (showing the conflict between “theological values, social val-
ues, [and] commonly understood standards of pastoral practice” in churches’ re-
sponse to domestic violence)).
136 Spaniards Angered by Bishops , at  http://www.etaiwannews.com/world/ 2004/
02/06/1076034307.htm (Feb. 6, 2004) (reporting that domestic violence is on the rise
in Spain, with at least one hundred women killed every year by their husbands).
137 Id .
138 See  Kathryn Casa, Violence at Home , NAT’L CATH. REP. (June 29, 2001),
available at  http://www.natcath.com/NCR_Online/archives/062901/062901a.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2005); see also  Linda L. Ammons, What’s God Got To Do With It?
Church and State Collaboration in the Subordination of Women and Domestic Vio-
lence , 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1207 (1999) (explaining how the dogma of male superi-
ority has been interpreted from Biblical Scripture and is now codified in church
teachings on gender roles); Nada L. Stotland, Tug-of-War:  Domestic Abuse and the
Misuse of Religion , 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 696 (2000).
139 Ammons, supra  note 138, at 1209.
140 U.S. Bishops’ Comms. on Women in Church & Society, and on Marriage and
Family Life, When I Call for Help , ORIGINS, Nov. 5, 1992; see also  Susan Hogan,
Bishops Denounce Domestic Violence , DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 13, 2002, at
1A (describing an updated statement calling on the church to help victims become
safe).
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scripture and church tradition.141
Conservative Christians also wield great legal and political in-
fluence, not simply through their cultural mores, but also by us-
ing the coercive power of the state.142  In 1996, Christian
Coalition Executive Director Ralph Reed boasted that sixty per-
cent of the Republican convention’s delegates supported his or-
ganization.143  The groups that comprise the religious right,
including the Christian Coalition,144 the Family Research Coun-
cil,145 and the Eagle Forum,146 advocate the promotion of what
they deem “family values,” consisting of marriage limited to het-
erosexual couples, upholding marriage as a solution for poverty,
and encouraging the traditional family model.147  Importantly,
the theological obstacles faced by conservative Christian battered
women are forced on all American women through the powerful
influence of the religious right.  The pro-family, anti-divorce po-
sition of the religious right contributes to acculturated victim
blaming, for the abused wife is deemed the one destroying the
family.148
In an agenda counter to the interests of battered women, the
conservative Christians have actively advocated for marriage as
the means to bring women out of poverty, adding incentives for
those on welfare.149  Rather than lobbying for job training and
financial literacy programs, this effort encourages their notion of
“traditional” families in which the wife stays at home with the
141 Marie M. Fortune, A Commentary on Religious Issues in Family Violence , in
VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 137, 138 (1991).
142 Christian Coalition website, at  http://www.cc.org/about.cfm.
143 Alan Elsner, Evangelicals Assert Control of Republican Party , Reuters, Aug 7,
1996.
144 Christian Coalition, supra  note 143. R
145 Family Research Council website, at  http://www.frc.org.
146 Eagle Forum website, at  http://www.eagleforum.org.
147 Id .; Christian Coalition, supra  note 143; Family Research Council, supra  note R
146. R
148 See, e.g. , Henry Weinstein, Great Society’s Legal Aid For Poor Targeted by
Budget Ax , L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995 (describing the religious right’s opposition to
funding for Legal Aid on the premise that these lawyers help women obtain di-
vorces; although most all of the divorces Legal Aid obtains are for abuse victims).
149 See  Kathleen Chapman, Florida Groups Brainstorm on Marriage Push , PALM
BEACH POST, Feb. 14, 2004, at 24A (reporting that Congress is debating a bill that
would provide $240 million to the states to promote marriage, but that some critics
are worried that women will be encouraged to commit to battering partners); see
also  Suzanne Fields, The Victorians and the New Safety Net , WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1995, at A25.
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children—dependent on the husband for all means of support.150
Absent a vehicle to learn skills and resources to leave the abusive
relationship, these programs will do little to help battered wo-
men, but instead will further entrap them.151  A more balanced
proposal is a bill filed in the West Virginia legislature offering a
lower fee for a marriage license if the couple will attend premari-
tal counseling.152  The bill’s sponsors say they believe counseling
could help reduce “domestic violence, financial problems, the di-
vorce rate and all the problems children face because of these
issues.”153
Judaism, too, has an historical tradition of promoting the patri-
archal family structure with codified expectations of women’s
compliance.154  A Jewish marriage contract, the ketubah , pro-
vides for dissolution of the marriage upon death or divorce, as
delineated by halakha  or Jewish law.155  Although halakha  for-
bids the intentional harming of another human being,156 until re-
cently many within the Jewish community denied that domestic
violence occurred among them—but in the rare acknowledge-
ments, it was assumed the victim had incited the abuse.157  Under
ketubah, the wife is obligated to complete the household duties
150 See, e.g. , Liz Schott, The Congressional Divide over TANF Reauthorization , 1
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 427 (2002) (noting the lack of training and services and
citing Robert Rector, Implementing Welfare Reform and Restoring Marriage , in PRI-
ORITIES FOR THE PRESIDENT (Stuart M. Butler & Kim Rhodes eds., 2001), available
at http://www.heritage.org/research/features/mandate/priorities.cfm (last visited Feb.
26, 2005)); see also  Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage:  A Revision , 102
MICH. L. REV. 129 (2003) (describing the federal financing of state and faith-based
organizations encouraging marriage for poor women).
151 Sharon G. Horne and Heidi M. Levitt, Shelter from the Raging Wind:  Relig-
ious Needs of Victims of Intimate Partner Violence and Faith Leaders’ Responses , J.
OF RELIGION & ABUSE, 2003, at 83, 86 (reporting that abuse victims who were coun-
seled by their churches to endure the abuse to show they were good Christians were
placed in increased danger).
152 Kris Wise, Bill Offers Marriage Incentive Plan Encourages Counseling to
Lower State Divorce Rate , CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 13, 2004, at 1C (report-
ing that couples can get $7 off the cost of a $35 marriage license for attending four
hours of counseling, and reporting that West Virginia recorded 10,000 divorces and
15,000 marriages in 2003).
153 Id .
154 See  Elliot N. Dorff & Arthur Rosett, A LIVING TREE:  THE ROOTS AND
GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW 17-18 (1988) (stating, for example, that during the time of
Abraham the extended family, or clan, was the usual family unit, with a male ruling
elder).
155 NAOMI GRAETZ, SILENCE IS DEADLY 63 (1998).
156 Id . at 70.
157 See  Beverly Horsburgh, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy:  Domestic Violence in the
Jewish Community , 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 209 (1995).
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and have consensual sexual relations with her husband, and if she
does not perform her duties, the husband may divorce her.158
With marriage, the husband also legally acquires the right to:  (1)
any income his wife earns; (2) whatever the wife finds; (3) the
fruits of the wife’s possessions and property; and (4) his wife’s
property.159
The delineation of these rights has led religiously adherent
Jewish women to believe they are prohibited from becoming fi-
nancially independent.  Just as Christian scripture has been mis-
interpreted to justify battering, so too have a number of abused
Jewish women believed they could not seek help as it would in-
volve lashon hara , or speaking badly about another—a violation
of halakha .160  Notably absent from the discourse was recogni-
tion that it was the batterer breaching lashon hara  by verbally
and psychologically abusing his spouse.  Some Jewish battered
women report being taught that it is their obligation to maintain
shalom bayit , peace in the home,161 and that this overarching
principle mandates that the marriage be preserved in all
circumstances.162
The ability to leave one’s abuser is important for a victim to
find safety.  Although halakha  gives the husband all of the wo-
man’s property, because marriage is a contract in Judaism, a wife
can sue her husband for breach of contract in addition to her suit
for battery.163  A wife is allowed to flee for safety, and she is not
required to return home if she can show that she is in physical
danger.164  Meanwhile, the husband is required to pay the debt
she incurs for living expenses although she is gone.165 Halakha
specifies that a man may divorce his wife, but she is not permit-
ted to divorce him prior to obtaining permission through a get .166
158 GRAETZ, supra  note 155, at 76-77.
159 Id . at 75.
160 Sandra Butler, A Covenant of Salt:  Violence Against Women in Jewish Life , J.
OF RELIGION & ABUSE, 2000, at 49, 53.
161 Id . at 56.
162 GRAETZ, supra  note 156, at 78. R
163 David E. S. Stein, Initiatives to Address Physical Violence by Jewish Husbands,
218 B.C.E.-1400 C.E , J. OF RELIGION & ABUSE, 2001, at 25, 36.
164 Id .
165 Id .
166 See ABRAHAM J. TWERSKI, THE SHAME BORNE IN SILENCE 30 (1996); Ran
Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism:  Three Middle Eastern
Tales , 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819, 1840 n.140 (2004) (explaining that “[u]nder Halakhic
law, the get (divorce decree) is a private act between the spouses . . . the ultimate
power to decide whether or not to dissolve the marriage remains with the husband).
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This seeming digression highlighting Judeo-Christian doctrine
is necessary to frame the perspective of judges, lawyers, politi-
cians, jurors, and other legal system stakeholders with the power
to sabotage victim safety.  Advocates and court personnel from
Lynchburg, Virginia express concern that one of their judges, af-
ter granting a protective order to unmarried victims cohabiting
with their batterers, calls the victims aside and gives them a stern
lecture about the moral dangers of “living in sin,” then admon-
ishes them to strongly consider marriage.167  When the Massa-
chusetts legislature was considering whether to pass a
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, Representative
Marie Parenti reprimanded her colleagues for leaving God in
church on Sunday and not voting their faith.168  Constitutional
mandates for the separation of church and state aside, the influ-
ence of religious doctrine on court practices in domestic violence
cases is unmistakable and does not bode well for abuse victims.
II
ONE DOCTRINAL OBSTACLE IS THE COURTS’ GENERAL
RELUCTANCE TO INTERFERE IN MARRIAGES, EVEN WITH THE
PRESENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Classic liberalism espouses the belief that individuals should be
able to act freely within the family and not fear governmental
intrusion.169  Since men were long considered to have jurisdiction
over their wives and children, legal indifference was justified.170
Courts’ deference to marriage takes the liberal notion a step fur-
ther, using the underpinnings of public policy to claim that al-
lowing state interference incites spousal disagreement and
litigation.171  Although perhaps understandable centuries and
167 As reported to the author on February 23, 2004 in Roanoke, Virginia.
168 Massachusetts Seeks Gay Marriage Compromise  (NPR broadcast, Feb. 12,
2004).  Rep. Parenti also reminded fellow legislators that the Catholic Church for-
bids homosexual relationships and would not recognize gay marriages.
169 See, e.g. , MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY 122 (1977) (arguing
that benefits of family privacy include maintaining pluralism).
170 See  Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality:  Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gen-
der of Jurisdiction , 14 YALE J.L. FEMINISM 393, 397 (2002) (noting that women’s
bodies were considered within the realm of households, headed by white males with
control over the women and children residing there).
171 See  Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 939 (E.D. Mich. 1940) (holding that
the state should refrain from inviting controversy and litigation within the marriage);
see also  Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex
Discrimination Law , 1979 WIS. L. REV. 55, 70-79 (discussing the manner in which
the law refrains from regulating marriage).
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even decades ago, the persistence of family primacy is particu-
larly troubling given the greater knowledge of domestic violence
and its deleterious influence on all family members and  the com-
munity at large.  Yet, throughout the court system, the family is
revered as a hallowed entity, romanticized in a Norman
Rockwell image that denies the need for intervention, in many
cases even with dangerous behavior threatening the very institu-
tion.  Asserting family privacy in the context of domestic violence
is disingenuous and contrary to the legislative intent of every
state’s abuse prevention laws:  to protect victims of domestic vio-
lence from the perpetrators.
Finding minimal acceptance of equality models within the civil,
family court sphere, women’s rights advocates turned to the
criminal justice system in the 1980s, hoping it would be more re-
ceptive to viewing domestic violence as a systemic manifestation
of women’s forced subordination.172  Additionally, advocates
mobilized numerous state gender bias task forces that over-
whelmingly documented the mistreatment of women within the
legal system.173  However, most states devoted neither financial
nor staff support to implement the reports’ recommended
changes.174
172 See, e.g., Reducing Case Attrition:  Working With Battered Women , RESPONSE
TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAM. Jan./Feb. 1981, at 5, 5-9 (citing the Seattle City Attor-
ney’s Battered Women’s Project that collaborated with the Seattle Police such that a
victim’s call to police triggered a letter from a project advocate, inviting the victim’s
input regarding the most appropriate counseling and sentence for the batterer).  The
author also worked as a court advocate with the Seattle City Attorney’s Family Vio-
lence Project (renamed from Battered Women’s Project in 1984) from 1984-1985
and witnessed one community’s transition from dealing with domestic violence as a
mostly private, civil matter to one taken seriously by the criminal justice system.
173 See, e.g. , Jane Marum Roush, Gender Bias Task Force:  Comments on Substan-
tive Law Issues,  58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095 (2001) (finding that while attorneys
highly rated the court’s handling of sexual assault cases, the service provider advo-
cates were quite negative in their assessment); see also  Deborah Hensler & Judith
Resnik, Contested Identities:  Task Forces on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias and the
Obligations of the Legal Profession , in ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Deborah L. Hode ed.,
2000); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts:  An Emerging Focus for
Judicial Reform , 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1989).
174 Massachusetts has followed up with a re-named Committee, several publica-
tions, and funded a staff person to assist in implementing changes. See COMMITTEE
FOR GENDER EQUALITY, MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, OPENING
DOORS:  MODEL PROJECTS PROVIDING ADVOCACY TO VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE SEEKING RELIEF IN EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS COURTS (1991).
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A. Privacy, Marriage, and Family Violence
Problematic to the family privacy paradigm is the continued
treatment of intimate partner violence as a troublesome relation-
ship issue rather than reflective of cultural norms regulating how
women and men may behave.175  It is ethically questionable for
the state to be the sole arbiter of what should remain private and
thus within the discretion of the spouses, and what may be con-
sidered by the court as within its purview.  At least interspousal
tort immunity has been gradually discarded in most jurisdictions,
beginning with Alabama in 1932.176  Some of the seminal cases
abrogating this bar addressed the absurd paradigm previously en-
forced by the state in which batterers were protected.  A West
Virginia court noted in 1978 that spousal immunity “permitted
the wife beater to practice his twisted frustrations secure in the
knowledge that he was immune from civil action except for a di-
vorce, and that any criminal penalty would ordinarily be a mod-
est fine.”177  By 1989, Georgia’s appellate court even upheld the
provision of punitive damages for a battered wife who had suc-
cessfully brought a tort action against her ex-husband for assault
and battery and false imprisonment.178
Although many judges resist interfering in marital problems
absent dangerous circumstances, others even refuse to imple-
ment clear statutory mandates in the face of domestic violence—
instead taking it upon themselves to decide if the abuse is so min-
imal that state intrusion is unwarranted.  One egregious example
is the Dunn case.179
Within days of Ms. Dunn’s murder, her father (Mr. Nigro)
called to ask for my help in reforming the courts to prevent this
tragedy from befalling others; he wanted to know how judges—
as tax-paid, public servants—had the power to not only humiliate
175 Resnik, supra  note 171, at 397 (citing a UNICEF research monograph arguing R
that violence against women is frequently “sanctioned under the garb of cultural
practices and norms”).
176 Bennett v. Bennett, 140 So. 378 (Ala. 1932); see also  Jones v. Pledger, 363 F.2d
986, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (permitting wife to bring wrongful death action against
husband); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979) (stating public policy
basis of allowing access to remedies for injury).
177 Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (W. Va. 1978); see also
Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988) (finding that divorce did not
bar civil tort claim for injuries suffered during marriage).
178 Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
179 Meier, supra  note 120, at 38 and accompanying text; McNamara, supra  note
122 and accompanying text. R
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abuse victims, but to so endanger them.  Mr. Nigro related his
frustration in trying to explain to the judge about Paul Dunn’s
violent conduct, but he was admonished to help his daughter
keep her marriage together.  Mr. Nigro was particularly upset
that Judge Heffernan had characterized the abuse as mutual, al-
though there was no testimony to that effect.180
Batterer’s treatment experts caution that abusers often portray
their violence as mutual and are adept at minimizing, blaming,
and claiming to be the valiant party that simply wants to save the
marriage.181  However, even more disturbing is the institutional
collusion, typified in the Dunn case, and aptly described by Pro-
fessor James Ptacek as social entrapment for the victims.182  He
notes that poverty and racism only exacerbate such victimization,
while identifying the courts as the institution with the greatest
power to remedy abuse injustices.183
The court’s reluctance to interfere is understandable when a
victim resents and resists its interventions, usually in the criminal
sphere.  However, the state must examine why these victims de-
cry assistance, in order to determine whether, in some areas of
private life the victim should decide if state intrusion is war-
ranted, or whether a compelling state interest exists to justify ac-
tion absent victim consent.184  Feminist scholars have discussed
women’s agency in the context of domestic violence, with most
arguing that woman abuse must be viewed as a public matter in
order to galvanize state intercession.185  With domestic violence
torts, the abuse victim is asking the state to get involved, request-
ing its assistance with an untenable situation.  As will be seen in
the following discussion on establishing a judicially manageable
180 Mr. Nigro initially called me on August 15, 1986, and we spoke frequently over
the next few years in our mostly successful efforts to reform the Massachusetts Judi-
cial Conduct Commission and increase accountability for those judges endangering
abuse victims and sabotaging state laws.
181 Adams, supra  note 74, at 165 (noting that batterers frequently deny or mini- R
mize their abusive conduct).
182 PTACEK, supra  note 129, at 9-10 (describing the forms of collusion docu- R
mented by historians and scholars).
183 Id . (noting that using social entrapment as the paradigm highlights the benefits
and detriments of utilizing courts as the primary means of remedy).
184 See, e.g ., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:  Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions , 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (arguing that pros-
ecutors must take the choice of prosecution away from the victim to send a message
that domestic violence is unacceptable).
185 E.g. , Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973,
974 (1991).
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threshold, courts should not interfere in families generally, but a
victim’s prima facie showing of abuse ought to compel
intervention.
A backlash, spawned by conservative women’s organizations
and popular books, characterized the analogy of domestic vio-
lence victims to other crime victims worthy of the court’s atten-
tion as “victim feminism.”186  They asserted that “power
feminism” was a more positive option, as it presumes women can
take responsibility for their own lives.187  Courts seem to reflect
this expectation that battered women should simply stop their
whining about abuse and put their lives back together rather than
seek legal assistance during the dissolution.  This simplistic for-
mulation reflects acute ignorance of the overwhelming obsta-
cles—legal, social, psychological, and physical—inherent in
leaving a violent partner.188  Equally problematic, the power
feminism proponents fail to recognize the systemic origins of
these obstacles, choosing instead a harsh, judgmental model that
presumes privilege and access to necessary resources.  Professor
Elizabeth Schneider notes, “Their work underscores the funda-
mental inadequacy of either  victimization or agency (reconceived
as ‘victim feminism’ or ‘power feminism’) to capture the com-
plexity of struggle in women’s lives, and highlights how this false
dichotomy leads to problematic extremes.”189
Importantly, agency and victimization are not mutually exclu-
sive,190 and courts, as powerful institutions with much influence
in how battered women survive abuse, must not justify their inac-
tion by blaming victims who are unable to extricate themselves
from the abusive relationship.  Even within the same day, let
alone the duration of breaking free, a survivor may be forced to
186 See ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
75 (2000).
187 See id . (citing KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER 29-50 (1993)); NAOMI
WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE 135-42, 305-21 (1993).
188 See  Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims
Stay , 28 COLO. LAW. 19 (1999) (describing lack of money and job skills, fear of
retaliation, bad prior experience with the legal system, family and religious pressure,
and low self-esteem as just a few of the many challenges facing victims wishing to
flee).
189 SCHNEIDER, supra  note 187, at 75. R
190 Id . at 76; see also  Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression?  Women’s
Lives, Violence, and Agency , in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 64
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (noting that agency
means not living with oppression, but that the “all-agent or all-victim conceptual
dichotomy will not be easy to escape or transform”).
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traverse being a victim, then agent, and back again—dependent,
in part, on the conduct of her batterer, the courts, and
community.
As scholars debate the theoretical virtues and pitfalls of pri-
vacy versus equality paradigms, activist lawyers and advocates
worry that a practical application has been left in the dust of
early wins.  The legal doctrine of privacy has afforded women a
number of crucial protections, including access to abortion191 and
birth control.192  Some feminist scholars, however, believe that
these reproductive rights cases should have been decided on the
basis of equality doctrine and not privacy.193  This public/private
distinction has not always served to promote women’s rights,
largely because clamoring for family privacy seems to be selec-
tively invoked to avoid protecting battered women in the home.
In abrogating interspousal immunity, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:  “The marriage relation is created by the consent of both
of the parties; inherently within such relationship is the consent
of both parties to physical contacts with the other, personal deal-
ings and ways of living which would be unpermitted and in some
cases unlawful as between other persons.”194
Other state supreme courts have echoed similar concerns
about proscribing otherwise unacceptable conduct within mar-
riages.195  In Twyman v. Twyman,  Texas Chief Justice Phillips
agreed to recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but not its application to married persons, although Jus-
tices Enoch and Hecht declined to approve of the tort in any
context.196  Chief Justice Phillips stated:
191 See  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to choose abor-
tion is premised on right to privacy).
192 See  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that privacy rights
grant a right to use contraceptives).
193 See  Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade:  A Study in Male Ideology , in ABOR-
TION 45, 52-53 (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds., 1984) (arguing that Roe ’s basis in
privacy instead of equality brought about Harris v. McRae , which held that Consti-
tution does not require public funding of abortions).
194 Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah 1980).
195 See, e.g. , Brown v. Brown, 409 N.E.2d 717, 718, 719 (Mass. 1980); Imag v.
March, 279 N.W.2d 382, 386 (Neb. 1979); Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420
(Minn. 1969).
196 855 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tex. 1993) (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting).  The
plurality notes that their disapproval of any tort action between spouses “would
seem to be better directed at the court’s earlier decisions to abrogate the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity in Bounds v. Caudle , 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), and
Price v. Price , 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987).” Id . at 622 n.13.
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[I]t does not necessarily follow that all conduct actionable be-
tween strangers is automatically actionable between spouses
. . . . I believe that a tort which is grounded solely on a duty
not to inflict emotional distress should not be cognizable in the
context of marriage.  Married couples share an intensely per-
sonal and intimate relationship.  When discord arises, it is in-
evitable that the parties will suffer emotional distress, often
severe . . . .  In such circumstances, the fact finder is left to
draw a virtually impossible distinction between recoverable
and disallowed injuries.197
In the instant case, the defendant, William Twyman, inflicted
grievous emotional abuse against his wife, Sheila Twyman, yet
the Chief Justice denied her relief because the perpetrator was
her husband which, according to Chief Justice Phillips, made it
“virtually impossible” to discern which harms to recognize.198
However, distinguishing between dubious and viable claims is
precisely what courts are designed and empowered to do.  Dis-
senting in Twyman , Justice Spector argued that the Chief Justice
had adopted a “medieval view of marital relations,” in which
spouses are “shielded from liability for even the most outrageous
acts against one another.”199
B. Judicially Manageable Thresholds
1. Balancing Concerns
Tension exists between courts’ efforts to decrease burgeoning
caseloads by encouraging no-fault divorce and abuse victims’ de-
sire to address marital harm and fault issues.  And again, the
public/private dichotomy emerges as an issue needing clarifica-
tion.  It is simple enough to state that once a victim can make a
prima facie showing of serious abuse, the shroud of privacy ought
to be lifted from the intimate relationship.  However, determin-
ing thresholds requires asking the question of who decides what
abuse is egregious enough to warrant consideration outside the
presumptive framework.  Should aggrieved spouses who may
want to litigate marital hurts decide?  Should judges choose,
though they may be ignorant of substantive domestic violence
issues and, thus, may unknowingly prejudice the abuse victim by
disallowing worthy claims?  And even well-informed judges may
be constrained by biased laws.  Feminist scholars have long ar-
197 Twyman , 855 S.W.2d at 627 (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting).
198 Id . at 620.
199 Id . at 644 (Spector, J., dissenting).
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gued that “the woman question” must regularly be asked to iden-
tify those standards and laws that, though they appear neutral,
fail to consider and value  the experiences of women.200  As the
cases cited herein confirm, enormously problematic practices
continue in the handling of domestic violence cases in many, if
not most, jurisdictions in this country.  Thus, the woman question
is relevant in law, particularly in domestic violence law, given
that such a disproportionate number of those abused are
women.201
Professor Katharine Bartlett explains that the woman question
forces examination of how institutional composition and social
structure perpetuate women’s subordinate status, even when
laws appear facially neutral.202  She elaborates:
Once adopted as a method, asking the woman question is a
method of critique as integral to legal analysis as determining
the precedential value of a case, stating the facts, or applying
law to facts.  “Doing law” as a feminist means looking beneath
the surface of law to identify the gender implications of rules
and the assumptions underlying them and insisting upon appli-
cations of rules that do not perpetuate women’s subordina-
tion.  It means recognizing that the woman question always
has potential relevance and that “tight” legal analysis never
assumes gender neutrality.203
The woman question is critical to analyzing a suitable thresh-
old, as application of any model necessarily requires a melding of
both objective and subjective evaluation of the battered spouse’s
experience of abuse.  Courts seek a predictable, uniform, and
neutral standard that tends to decrease litigation and manipula-
tive behavior by the divorcing parties.  However, rigid guidelines
eliminate much of the needed ability to customize case disposi-
tions reflective of the individual circumstances in each family.204
200 See, e.g ., Carol C. Gould, The Woman Question:  Philosophy of Liberation and
the Liberation of Philosophy , in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY:  TOWARD A THEORY OF
LIBERATION 5 (Carol C. Gould & Marx W. Wartofsky eds., 1976) (discussing the
woman question in philosophy); Mary E. Hawkesworth, Feminist Rhetoric:  Dis-
courses on the Male Monopoly of Thought , 16 POL. THEORY 444, 452-56 (1988) (ex-
amining the treatment of the woman question in political theory) (as cited in
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods , 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 n.23
(1990)) (noting also that the first use of the term “woman question” of which she is
aware is in Simone De Beauvoir’s The Second Sex .
201 See  sources cited supra  note 5 (documenting the disproportionate degree of R
victimization by gender).
202 Bartlett, supra  note 201, at 843. R
203 Id .
204 See, e.g. , Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases?  An Empir-
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In response, rebuttably presumptive standards have been
deemed necessary to handle the high number of divorces,205 but
every state’s case law indicates that outrageous conduct within
the marriage is deemed compensable.206
2. Conduct Surpassing the Threshold
Offenses for which battered women may seek remedies range
from intentional torts (such as assault, battery, stalking, and eco-
nomic fraud), to negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED)207 and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED).208  Typically, aggrieved spouses claim IIED as caused by
the specific allegations of abuse, usually assault and battery.209
Although it is beyond the purview of this Article to fully discuss
IIED, a brief discussion will be included as it relates to the crea-
tion of a realistic threshold and represents the issue of greatest
ical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 505-27 (1996)
(discussing the trade-offs between determinate and discretionary decision-making
custody standards).
205 Approximately five million domestic relations actions were filed in state courts
in 1999. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 1999-2000 30 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2001).  However, there were
about 7.1 million other civil cases of all kinds filed in 1999 in state courts of general
jurisdiction. Id . at 18.
206 Based on an author-created database of every state’s divorce laws, including
requirements for no-fault divorce and whether they mandate joinder of tort and
divorce actions.  On file with author; see also  Erik V. Wicks, Fault-Based Divorce
“Reforms,” Archaic Survivals, and Ancient Lessons , 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1565, 1587
(2000) (noting that spouse abuse was illegal in every state by 1920).
207 Some states have refused to recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, see, e.g. , Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993) (“We hold
that there is no general duty in Texas not to negligently inflict emotional distress.”),
while a minority of states have upheld the duty, see, e.g. , Taylor v. Baptist Medical
Ctr., Inc., 400 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co.,
398 A.2d 1180 (Conn. 1978); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970); Gammon
v. Osteopathic Hosp. Of Maine, Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987); Johnson v. Super-
save Markets, Inc., 686 P.2d 209 (Mont. 1984); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765
(Mo. 1983); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C.
1990); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1983) (cited in Boyles ,
855 S.W.2d at 599 n.4).
208 See, e.g. , Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1988) (plaintiff sued
her former husband for assault and battery and IIED, based on six years of marriage
during which he engaged in intentional, assaultive conduct, including throwing cof-
fee on her, kicking, slapping, and hitting her, and tearing at her ear; after a jury
verdict, the court awarded the wife $15,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000
in punitive damages).
209 See, e.g. , Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. 1995) (wife brought
tort claims based on assault and battery, as well as intentional infliction of emotional
distress ).
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contention in domestic violence tort cases.  It is also yet another
area of tort that evidences the nexus between tort and intimate
partner violence.  Further, IIED is important because, as a firmly
rooted legal doctrine, it confers credibility to a battered woman’s
telling of the dire harm she has suffered.  If only assault and bat-
tery or other direct harms are recognized, the court may lose an
understanding of the depth of physical and emotional pain in-
flicted when it is the intimate partner who has repeatedly be-
trayed the plaintiff with his abusive conduct.210
An increasing number of courts have found that detailed alle-
gations of domestic violence do meet the standard for severe
emotional distress.211  Some jurisdictions, though allowing IIED
to address tortious conduct during the marriage, take great care
to warn that a very high bar will be set for IIED in the family law
realm.212  Further permutations emerge as courts allow IIED
claims for “bystander view” and the resulting trauma exper-
ienced by the battered mother and her son.213
The majority of courts recognize that public policy concerns
should not impede spouses or former spouses filing for IIED
based on harmful behavior during the marriage.214  Gradually,
some courts find that, within the IIED framework, they can for-
mulate a discernable line between the inherent distress of di-
vorce and severe psychological abuse.215  Judges do want the
discretion to determine a cognizable threshold of harm under
which no claim is permitted.  However, there is growing disincli-
nation to grant judicial discretion in the family law arena,216
210 See infra  note 246 and accompanying text for discussion of betrayal harm. R
211 See, e.g. , Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. 2002) (ruling that
after being severely battered over eleven years of marriage, wife was not barred
from bringing IIED claim against her husband); see also  Henriksen v. Cameron, 622
A.2d 1135 (Me. 1995) (finding that woman could bring IIED suit against her ex-
husband for severe domestic violence inflicted during the marriage).
212 See, e.g. , Christians v. Christians, 637 N.W.2d 377 (S.D. 2001) (noting also a
preference that such actions be brought with the dissolution proceedings).
213 See, e.g. , Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1993) (permitting sepa-
rate tort action subsequent to the final divorce).
214 See, e.g. , Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2003) (citing the court’s
review of case law from around the country addressing this issue).
215 See, e.g. , McColloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 2001) (noting that “legal
relief in addition to divorce is justified for an [intentional infliction of emotional
distress] claim.”); see also  Henricksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Me. 1993)
(stating that although divorce may allow a victim to escape the abuse, it does not
permit compensatory relief).
216 Judith D. Moran, Judicial Independence in Family Courts: Beyond the Election-
Appointment Dichotomy , 37 FAM. L.Q. 361, 377 (2003) (stating that the crux of the
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where most of these domestic violence tort actions would likely
be heard.  Professor John J. Sampson notes that it is preferable to
have our elected representatives create family law policy rather
than lawyers, particularly gubernatorially-appointed judges.217
He elaborates that even when elected, judges are rarely chosen
based on policy matters, with consideration of family law issues
virtually non-existent.218  Thus, this is not a call to make all mari-
tal matters open for court intervention, but rather for court inter-
vention with a prima facie showing of serious harm.
What conduct, then, is outrageous enough?  In Hakkila v.
Hakkila ,219 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that marital
conduct warranted a higher level of protection than what might
be accorded interactions between strangers.220  The trial court
found that the husband’s ten years of physical, verbal, and emo-
tional abuse against the wife was so extreme and outrageous that
she could recover for IIED.  In his appeal, the husband argued
that public policy should prevent recognition of IIED within the
confines of marriage.  Although not fully supporting the hus-
band’s position, the appellate court nonetheless held that IIED
should only be afforded quite narrow application between
spouses221 and cited agreement with the commentary to Section
895G of the Second Restatement of Torts:
The intimacies of family life also involve intended physical
contacts that would be actionable between strangers but may
be commonplace and expected within the family.  Family
romping, even roughhouse play and momentary flares of tem-
per not producing serious hurt, may be normal in many house-
holds, to the point that the privilege arising from consent
becomes analogous.222
Citing the frequency with which spouses suffered emotional
distress because of the other’s reckless or intentional behavior,223
the court stated that open communication between the couple
judicial independence dilemma may be society’s growing hesitation to grant judges’
decision making in family law).
217 John J. Sampson, Bringing the Courts to Heel:  Substituting Legislative Policy
for Judicial Discretion , 33 FAM. L.Q. 565 (1999) (commenting on the movement of
legislatures taking control of family law guidelines).
218 Id .
219 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
220 Id . at 1326.
221 Id . at 1324.
222 Id . at 1323 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt H (1979)).
223 Id . at 1324; see infra  notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
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would suffer if liability for improper conduct were permitted.224
The court’s attempt to analogize serious domestic violence with
the fun “horseplay” of family life is minimization at its most bla-
tant.  Its description of short-lived bursts of anger not causing
serious harm as normal, and therefore consensual in some house-
holds, is not an accurate portrayal of the planned pattern of coer-
cive abuse used by batterers to maintain control of their
partners.225  Further, it is highly discretionary what the court
deems to constitute “serious hurt,” applying an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness with a subjective view of how this  plain-
tiff was harmed.  To then cite a 1984 law review article as the
basis for legal policy curtailing the rights of women to obtain re-
dress for abuse,226 ostensibly to prevent deteriorating communi-
cation, reflects faulty reasoning.  It is ludicrous to presume that
“open communication” is occurring when one spouse is battering
the other, for fear of retaliation alone silences the victim.
The Hakkila  court states it has not barred spousal IIED cases,
but this opinion creates an absurdly high threshold that must be
met by a battered woman seeking redress in tort.227  Acknowl-
edging that New Mexico no longer recognizes the doctrine of in-
terspousal immunity, the court nonetheless imposes an elevated
standard of outrageousness cloaked in the disingenuous language
of protecting the marital relationship that the batterer is already
destroying.228  The Hakkila  facts would seem to meet even a rig-
orous IIED standard, for the trial court found that the husband’s
abuse which caused her harm was as follows:
[Husband] on occasions throughout the marriage and continu-
ing until the separation[:]
a. assaulted and battered [wife],
b. insulted [wife] in the presence of guests, friends, relatives,
and foreign dignitaries,
c. screamed at [wife] at home and in the presence of others,
d. on one occasion locked [wife] out of the residence over
224 Id . at 1325.
225 Adams, supra  note 74, at 163 (noting that most state standards for batterer’s R
intervention programs define battering as “a pattern of coercive control” often in-
volving economic, physical, emotional, and sexual abuse).
226 See Hakkila , 812 P.2d at 1325 (citing Constance Ward Cole, Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress Among Family Members , 61 DENV. U. L. REV 553, 574
(1984)) (“Because the family’s functioning depends upon open and free communica-
tion, even negative give and take is necessary.”).
227 See Hakkila , 812 P.2d at 1325-26.
228 Id . at 1326.
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night in the dead of winter while she had nothing on but a
robe,
e. made repeated demeaning remarks regarding [wife’s]
sexuality,
f. continuously stated to [wife] that she was crazy, insane, and
incompetent,
g. refused to allow [wife] to pursue schooling and hobbies,
h. refused to participate in normal marital relationship with
[wife] which ultimately resulted in only having sexual relations
with [wife] on four occasions in the last three years of the
marriage,
i. blamed his sexual inadequacies upon [wife].229
Based on these facts, the trial court decided that the husband
intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon his wife and
that his acts were “so outrageous in character and so extreme in
degree as to be beyond all possible bounds of decency and were
atrocious and utterly intolerable.”230  In overruling that decision,
the appellate court found persuasive and cited a 1936 law review
article in which a Professor Magruder states, “It would be unfor-
tunate if the law closed all the safety valves through which irasci-
ble tempers might legally blow off steam.”231  At no time does
Arnold Hakkila, the defendant, claim he was just “blowing off
steam”; rather, he engaged in a pattern of unlawful, vicious phys-
ical assaults on his wife, as well as a range of psychological abuse
that the trial court accurately determined met the standard ele-
ments of IIED.
Noting the wife’s “suffering from acute depression since ap-
proximately 1981,”232 the trial court cited this as indicative of the
229 Id . at 1321.
In late 1984 when wife was pushing her finger in husband’s chest, he
grabbed her wrist and twisted it severely.  In 1981 during an argument in
their home husband grabbed wife and threw her face down across the
room, into a pot full of dirt.  In 1978, when wife was putting groceries in the
camper, husband slammed part of the camper shell down on her head and
the trunk lid on her hands.
Id . at 1322.
The wife also testified that at a Christmas party at the home of friends:  “At about
11:00 p.m. wife approached husband, who was ‘weaving back and forth with his
hands in his pockets,’ and suggested that they go home.  Husband began screaming,
‘You f_____ bitch, leave me alone.’  Wife excused herself and walked home alone.”
Id .  Finally, evidence at trial stated that “Throughout the marriage husband made
remarks such as, ‘You’re just plain sick, you’re just stupid, you’re just insane.’” Id .
230 Id . at 1321.
231 Id . at 1324 (citing Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts , 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936)).
232 Hakkila , 812 P.2d at 1321.
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harm from the husband’s tortious acts, although the appellate
court chose to frame the trial court’s act as possibly impinging on
the husband’s rights, stating:  “Many, if not all, of us need some
freedom to vent emotions in order to maintain our mental
health.  The law should not require a degree of civility beyond
our capacity.”233  Such flimsy reasoning would neither excuse nor
mitigate criminal charges of assault and battery that could easily
lie in this case, and certainly it conflicts with accepted standards
of intolerable behavior.  Indeed, the often-cited Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46, comment d, specifies that to qualify for
IIED, the defendant’s conduct must be so extreme “as to go be-
yond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.”234  Yet, the
Hakkila  court deems that refraining from violent and abusive be-
havior within marriage requires “a degree of civility beyond our
capacity.”235  This rationale is not only insulting to men, but
poses a terrifying prospect for women who marry.
Additionally, a well settled doctrine in tort law is that of the
eggshell or thin-skull plaintiff,236 affirming that the tortfeasor
takes his victim as he finds her.237  Thus, even if one ascribes to
the barbaric notion that Mr. Hakkila may physically and emo-
tionally abuse his wife in the cause of maintaining his own mental
health, that conduct ought to be circumscribed by the knowledge
that she was in a fragile state of mind.  The thin skull doctrine
would not hold Mr. Hakkila responsible for the depression Mrs.
Hakkila suffered prior to their marriage, only for aggravating it
with his abusive behavior.238
The Hakkila  decision is useful to examine in detail because it
elucidates the very doctrinal obstacles discussed herein, but also
because it offers the opportunity to discuss the specifics of a do-
mestic violence tort threshold.  In evaluating a case, a court can
233 Id . at 1324.
234 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
235 Hakkila , 812 P.2d at 1324.
236 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 851-52 (2000) (stating that if a defen-
dant knows he is dealing with a particularly sensitive plaintiff, he is obligated to act
with greater care).
237 See id . at 465 (explaining that even if the special sensitivity is not foreseeable
to the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all the harm, thus making the
defendant liable for preexisting conditions).
238 Id .  Professor Dobbs states further that the thin skull rule arises when the
defendant’s conduct would place a normal person at risk, and having done that, the
defendant is then liable for the actual harm caused.
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examine a minimum of five factors to determine whether the de-
fendant’s conduct meets the IIED standard of being so extreme
“as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.”239  The
proposed five factors are duration, severity, harm, pattern, and
context.  Each of these considerations is interrelated, such that
often they coexist and exacerbate the harm caused, although also
highlighting the specifics of a particular plaintiff’s case.
Duration means determining what period of time the plaintiff
endured abuse and  the accompanying fear of impending harm.
In my experience, battered women who are beaten sporadically
report the same levels of dread and fear as those abused more
frequently.  As the subsequent discussion of continuing tort doc-
trine describes, many jurisdictions have now recognized that the
statute of limitations for tort claims should be tolled if the abuse
constitutes “a continuous and unbroken wrong,”240 over a pro-
longed period of time.  Duration underscores the importance of
factoring in the entire length of time that a plaintiff suffered the
harm, as well as its severity.
Severity connotes not only the harm from individual acts of
abuse, but also the cumulative  physical and emotional effects of
that abuse.  Batterers frequently inflict many forms of trauma,
each intensifying the harm of the others.241  The Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46, comment j, adds, “[t]he intensity and du-
ration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining
its severity.”242  Additionally, the extreme and offensive charac-
ter of the defendant’s conduct will be evaluated to determine if
the abuse constitutes severe emotional distress.243  Here, the
thin-skull plaintiff doctrine applies if the defendant’s conduct
caused the plaintiff’s preexisting conditions of physical or mental
illness to worsen.244
Harm indicates the adverse consequences a plaintiff suffered
as a result of the defendant’s intentional or negligent acts, includ-
ing both physical and mental manifestations.  Also germane as an
239 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
240 Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 118 (N.J. Super. 1995).
241 See supra  Part I.A.2 for more complete discussion of the totality of harms.
242 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965) (as cited in McGrath v.
Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. 1988)).
243 See  Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. 1992).
244 See supra  notes 236-37 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
issue.
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aggravating factor is what I have termed betrayal harm , to reflect
the particular trauma inflicted when the victim is injured by an
intimate partner in whom she has placed great trust.245  This dis-
proportionate reliance confers the responsibility to avoid inten-
tionally harming the other, just as the concept of fiduciary duty
between spouses imposes an obligation of utmost good faith and
fair dealing.246  Betrayal harm also seeks to capture the intensely
personal nature of intimate partner torts, unlike those occurring
between strangers or in the realm of business.  The intimate na-
ture of the relationship means that the defendant knows his part-
ner’s areas of greatest vulnerability, and often exploits those
entrusted secrets with particular viciousness.247  Some courts do
not hold batterers to the same standard of care toward their inti-
mate partners as is required toward strangers.248
Thus, it could be argued that, rather than lowering the thresh-
old for IIED within the context of marriage, it ought to be raised
in acknowledgement of the added trauma when the perpetrator
is a current or former intimate partner.  Since the vast majority of
batterers choose  to be abusive,249 this higher standard could
serve a deterrent function in helping them select another option
when displeased with their partners.  Again, the thin-skull plain-
tiff concept is relevant as many batterers claim the victim had
preexisting depression or physical impairments for which he
should not be held responsible.250
245 I think it is helpful to name this abuse to call attention to its unique aspects
that may give rise to increased recovery if the severity is shown to be sufficient.
246 See , e.g. , RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (stating that in most states,
a marriage creates a relationship of trust and confidence between the spouses, re-
quiring the utmost good faith in their dealings with each other); see also  Sprick v.
Sprick, 25 S.W.3d 7, 15 (Tex. App. 1999) (McClure, J., concurring) (stating that be-
cause of the confidential relationship between a husband and wife, the marital part-
nership is fiduciary in nature and, therefore, precludes the commission of economic
torts against the community estate).
247 See , e.g. , Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 620 n.1.  Mrs. Sheila Twyman
testified at trial that her husband insisted that the only way to save their marriage
was for her to engage in sadomasochistic bondage activities, although he knew these
were very traumatizing since she had been raped at knifepoint prior to their
marriage.
248 See  Rhonda L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Women and Tort Law:  A New
Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence , 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1029-30 (1992)
(arguing that courts also seem to overlook this in barring subsequent tort actions
based on res judicata if the victim did not raise the abuse in the divorce).
249 Adams, supra  note 74. R
250 See supra  notes 236-37 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
issue.
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In establishing a judicially manageable threshold, the concept
of betrayal harm can assist the trier of fact in determining the
degree of malice exhibited by the defendant.  In Caron v. Caron ,
Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court upheld a jury award of $119,000
in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages to the
battered ex-wife, and $20,000 in compensatory damages and
$35,000 in punitive damages to the abused stepson for claims of
assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.251  During the marriage, Arthur, the defendant, repeatedly
assaulted and threatened Elaine, the plaintiff,252 as well as her
son, Wade.  Arthur force-fed Wade, and if he vomited or gagged,
Arthur made Wade swallow the vomit.  Arthur also threw Wade
at the wooden arm of a couch, causing a deep cut over Wade’s
eye.  In a separate incident, Arthur gave Wade two black eyes by
slapping him repeatedly in the face.  Arthur also insisted that
Wade stay in his room until Arthur left for work, causing Wade
to urinate in his pajamas because he was denied access to the
bathroom.253
After the couple separated, Elaine testified that “almost every
other day” Arthur made death threats to her.254  In admitting to
making “numerous” death threats to her, Arthur said that he
considered these to be factual statements rather than just threats.
Although the divorce was final, Arthur’s abuse of Elaine contin-
ued, including a prolonged assault in which he took hold of
Elaine by her ponytail, knocked her feet out from under her, pul-
led her around the house, and repeatedly kicked her in her side.
He then threw Elaine off his forty-inch high porch, causing her a
permanent, disabling knee injury as she hit the cement sidewalk.
Surgery has not been able to correct the injury, and Elaine has
had to leave her employment.  She now suffers from post-trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD), manifested in her fear of leaving
the house by herself, and has flashbacks of the assault, night-
mares, a severe bladder control problem, and a high anxiety
level.255  In pleading guilty to criminal assault, Arthur admitted
251 Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Me. 1990).
252 Elaine testified that the abuse included Arthur stranding her on a tree limb,
then throwing rocks at her knuckles to make her fall, locking her out of the house
when she had on only her nightgown, and twice attempting to kill her dogs. Id . at
1180.
253 Id .
254 Id . at 1179.
255 Id .
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that he grabbed Elaine by her ponytail in a manner that caused
her to lose her footing, but justified his conduct by stating he was
“using a reasonable amount of force . . . necessary to remove
her.”256
In affirming this minimal damages award, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court noted that the principal goal of punitive damages
is to “express[ ] society’s disapproval of intolerable conduct and
[to] deter[ ] such conduct where no other remedy could suffice,”
and that it is quite permissible to apply this remedy in child and
spousal abuse cases.257  The court justified the amount as reason-
able in light of the defendant’s income ($234,000 for the previous
three years) and assets (he claimed $285,000 in total assets, not
including $50,000 in accounts payable), particularly given the evi-
dence of intentional malice in the violent and intimidating abuse
committed, and Elaine’s continuing incapacitating fear of
Arthur.258
Detail of the Caron  case is offered under the harm category of
determining a reasonable threshold as it highlights the impor-
tance of addressing some of the debilitating after-effects of inti-
mate partner abuse.  Whether for measuring degree of harm or
assessing damages, the residual harm should be neither underes-
timated nor excluded from the calculation of harm suffered by
the plaintiff.
Pattern refers to the course and accumulation of harmful acts
that typify the battering relationship over time.  Batterer treat-
ment experts emphasize that domestic violence is a planned pat-
tern  of harm that reflects the perpetrator’s sense of entitlement:
his abuse is a tool to gain compliance from his partner.259
Whether the harm is inflicted in a random or routinized fashion,
batterers typically display their own individualized pattern of
abuse that reflects their proclivities for imposing their will on
their partners.  As can be seen from the case examples, batterers
are adept at justifying their abuse260 as part of their patterns of
carefully targeted humiliation and degradation.261
256 Id .  In this incident, Arthur had invited Elaine to his home to pick up their
daughter, Nicole, after visitation.
257 Id . at 1180 (citing Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me. 1985)).
258 Caron , 577 A.2d at 1180.
259 Adams, supra  note 74. R
260 See , e.g. , Caron , 577 A.2d at 1179, in which the defendant rationalizes a brutal
assault as necessary to get his wife to leave.
261 See DONALD G. DUTTON, THE BATTERER 35 (describing the high level of cre-
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Finally, context provides the background dynamics of a spe-
cific abusive relationship, allowing the court to fully examine the
totality of the circumstances and thus permitting a more equita-
ble examination of the case.  In the McGrath  opinion, the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized several factors to consider when eval-
uating whether a defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous,
finding the power and control analysis particularly helpful in re-
viewing marital tort cases:
It is clear . . . that the degree of power or authority which a
defendant has over a plaintiff can impact upon whether that
defendant’s conduct is outrageous.  The more control which a
defendant has over the plaintiff, the more likely that defen-
dant’s conduct will be deemed outrageous, particularly when
the alleged conduct involves either a veiled or explicit threat
to exercise such authority or power to plaintiff’s detriment.
Threats, for example, are much more likely to be a part of
outrageous conduct when made by someone with the ability to
carry them out than when made by someone in a compara-
tively weak position.262
Context provides another lens through which the court can
evaluate the “macro” view of the relationship, rather than simply
focusing on the “micro” of words or punches that may garner
initial attention.  The Hakkila  court notes at the outset of its
opinion that Arnold Hakkila had a Ph.D. in chemistry and was
employed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the duration
of the marriage.  Peggy Hakkila had only a high school diploma,
had earned some credits toward a baccalaureate degree in chem-
istry, had a vocational degree as a chemical technician, and was a
secretary at the laboratory prior to becoming a chemical techni-
cian.263  The relevance of each spouse’s level of educational at-
tainment and work history is questionable, particularly when not
discussing division of marital property, alimony, or other subjects
in which their respective income or earning potential is being re-
viewed.  However, the disparity between Arnold and Peggy’s
professional status and income, coupled with the detailed ac-
counts of one-sided harmful conduct, should have cued the Hak-
kila  court to the evident power imbalance that typifies abusive
relationships.
The confluence of these five factors—duration, severity, harm,
ativity used by batterers in delivering themed abuse designed to undercut that which
is most important to their partners).
262 McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988).
263 Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
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pattern, and context—is evident in the similar facts of the Hak-
kila and Feltmeier  cases, with the New Mexico and Illinois Su-
preme Courts arriving at opposite conclusions.  In Feltmeier , the
Illinois Supreme Court explains with admirable precision and in-
tellectual acuity why it found the presenting facts to be
actionable:
It combines more than a decade of verbal insults and humilia-
tions with episodes where freedom of movement was deprived
and where physical injury was often inflicted.  The alleged pat-
tern of abuse, combined with its duration, worked a humilia-
tion and loss of self-esteem.  Regardless of the form in which it
arrived, violence was certain to erupt, and when seasons of
spousal abuse turn to years that span the course of a decade,
we are unwilling to dismiss it on grounds that it is unworthy of
outrage.264
An added tension is that courts seek finality of divorces to
eliminate the couple’s returning to court with post-dissolution
conflicts, yet there must be room for flexibility to address chang-
ing circumstances or ongoing harm, particularly given Dr.
DeKeseredy’s data on the frequency of post-divorce sexual,
physical, and psychological abuse.265
3. Judicial Quagmire
When attempting to offer a judicially manageable threshold
for tort matters accompanying divorce, the woman question
reveals disproportionate bias against abuse victims by assuming
that any  dividing line can be drawn by the court absent a full
review of the duration, severity, harm, pattern, and context of the
abuse.  As the above comparison between the Hakkila  and
Feltmeier  cases illustrates, judges do set policy through the rheto-
ric of their legal opinions, performing a powerful interpretive
function in their social construction of battered women’s exper-
iences.  In order to eliminate the doctrinal obstacles for battered
women seeking tort remedies, it is necessary to acknowledge the
role of judges in maintaining the status quo, whether ascribing
this to the pre-realist notion of reiterating extant law266 or the
legal realist view of moving past a mechanical judging func-
264 Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d 1032, 1039-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
265 See supra  notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
266 See  Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making , 30
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 7 (1998).
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tion.267  Judges are key stakeholders in the evolution of institu-
tionalized cultural norms accepting domestic violence, but some
have emerged as champions in accepting the challenge to ex-
amine gendered expectations.268
Judges face the conundrum of balancing the expectation that
they make complex decisions quickly,269 while not losing sight of
the human dimension—the purpose of law.  It is remarkable that
more judges do not report at least a degree of angst in deciding
cases impacting the very safety and well being of the litigants, as
in domestic violence matters.  Interesting, too, is that the opin-
ions claiming the necessity of ensuring the veritable floodgates
are not opened to every disgruntled, divorcing spouse appear to
be particularly disconnected from the issues of gendered distor-
tion in their appraisal of the facts.270  What these opinions are
really saying is that they fear the crumbling of the walls of male
privilege, as is evident in numerous cases in which battered wo-
men have killed their batterers in classic self-defense, yet are de-
nied that mitigation.271  Duncan Kennedy warns that “many
particular claims of legal necessity in judicial opinions are uncon-
vincing on their face, and therefore raise the question of what is
‘really’ determining the outcome.”272
Another challenge is that of motivating backward judges to-
ward introspection in the hope that this will spark insight into
their biases and revision of their unjust thinking.273  Changing
267 See, e.g. , Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now , 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 504
(1988).
268 For example, Judge Mike Denton, presiding judge of the Travis County (Tex.)
Domestic Violence Court since its inception in January of 1999, met with myriad
community stakeholders and court staff weekly for a year before the court started to
ensure their inclusion in the planning and implementation of the court’s mandate.
Judge Denton regularly attends training sessions on domestic violence law, dynam-
ics, and model practices, and periodically seeks guidance from victims, offenders,
and all practitioners regarding how he can improve the court.
269 Judge Posner states that judges must be able to make quick decisions and leave
the cases, that those who are “most introspective, sensitive, and scrupulous people—
do not become judges, do not stay judges, or are unhappy judges.” RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 192 (1990) (as cited in Simon, supra
note 267, at 132). R
270 See Hakkila  case discussion, supra  notes 219-35 and accompanying text.
271 See generally  Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Wo-
men Defendants:  A Normative Construct , 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217 (2003); see
also RICHIE, supra  note 52. R
272 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 29 (1997).
273 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108 (1930).  Frank further
suggests that judges have training in psychology and undergo psychoanalysis, id . at
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cultural norms, coupled with social sanctions, can engender ex-
trinsic motivation, as is evidenced by transforming attitudes
about sexual harassment.274  Organized court watches can also be
effective in changing judicial practices, if the problematic behav-
ior is carefully documented and relayed to the court with specific
recommendations for change.275
C. The Failure of No-Fault Divorce in the Context of
Domestic Violence
No-fault divorce statutes have now been enacted in every
state,276 meaning that the parties need not allege grounds or
fault, but merely must assert irreconcilable differences.277  Such
laws were passed in an effort to remedy the problem that parting
spouses were often forced to contrive claims of adultery or cruel
and abusive behavior in order to secure a divorce.  This sea
change occurred at a time when policymakers were largely una-
ware of domestic violence, and thus did not consider the ramifi-
cations of eliminating potential remedies for outrageous,
dangerous conduct.  It is incomprehensible that legislators in-
tended to foreclose abuse victims from filing tort actions as part
of the no-fault effort.  Rather, the goal was to further the public
policy of making divorce less contentious by ending practices re-
quiring humiliating accusations.  By allowing couples to claim ir-
reconcilable differences, neither party was forced to lie or air the
couple’s private problems.  Additionally, no-fault divorces pro-
moted administrative efficiency by greatly decreasing the time
necessary to process a divorce, as another goal was to effect a
148, 156, but that seems a highly unrealistic suggestion, but one from which lawyers,
too, could benefit.
274 Simon, supra  note 267, at 141 (citing Roy F. Baumeister & Kristin L. Sommer, R
Consciousness, Free Choice, and Automaticity,  10 ADVANCES SOC. COGNITION 75,
77-79 (1997)).
275 See  Sarah M. Buel, The Pedagogy of Domestic Violence Law:  Situating Do-
mestic Violence Work in Law Schools, Adding the Lenses of Race and Class , 11 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 348-50 (2003) (describing the purpose and im-
plementation of a court watch program).
276 See IRA ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 177-86 (2d ed. 1991); see also HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-42 (Michie 2004) (showing statutory adoption of the “irre-
trievable breakdown” standard for adjudicating a divorce claim); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42-361 (Michie 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 458:7-a (2004).
277 See , e.g. , In re  Marriage of Bates, 490 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Joy v.
Joy, 734 P.2d 811 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1996);
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf,
677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984).
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“clean break” between parties and encourage a one-time division
of the marital estate.278  Thus, no-fault divorces were intended to
rectify a worsening family law problem, not foreclose options for
badly harmed abuse victims.
No-fault divorce doctrine is premised on the assumption that it
is better for the community to not attribute blame.  The term
“no-fault” was not meant to be interpreted literally, for each
party may be full of recrimination.279  Instead, there was an as-
sumption that the family and community benefited from the ac-
cusations remaining private.  No-fault laws hope to promote the
social policy of less acrimonious divorces and, in turn, allow the
adult and child family members to get on with their lives.280  One
problem in most domestic violence cases, however, is that the
batterer will allow neither an amicable divorce nor a peaceful
existence for his ex-spouse, thereby sabotaging important goals
of no-fault.281  However, lawyers and judges often find it difficult
to hear the panoply of past and present harm, including a degrad-
ing regimen of assaults, humiliation, threats, stalking, and verbal
abuse, coupled with the demand of total obedience.  Some find
the vicious conduct incomprehensible, although others have be-
come inured to yet another story of a mistreated battered wo-
man.  The result is that the abuse victim is prevented from
providing an accurate picture of the totality of harm suffered, the
cumulative impact of enduring virtual torture at the hands of an
intimate partner.
Yet courts insist on generalizing about the potential negative
consequences of allowing evidence of fault.  In Chapman , the
court said that “[t]o permit evidence on the question of fault
would necessarily bring into focus past conduct of the parties,
with endless invectives hurled at each other—all to the lasting
detriment of the parties and their children.”282  Silencing domes-
tic violence victims in court benefits no one:  giving a batterer the
278 See  Drake v. Drake, 725 A.2d 717 (Pa. 1999).
279 See  Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture , 1994
UTAH L. REV. 741 (stating that a primary goal of no-fault changes was to decrease
the traditional hostility inherent in fault-based divorce).
280 See , e.g. , Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. App. 1973) (stating that
the purposes of the no-fault divorce laws are to mitigate the possible harm to the
spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution process, and to preserve
and strengthen the integrity of marriage and family relationships).
281 See id . (noting that no-fault divorce laws are intended to promote amicable
dispute resolution between parties to a marriage).
282 Chapman , 498 S.W.2d at 137.
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green light to continue his abuse decreases the likelihood that he
will spend time in prison for his increasingly more serious crimes.
Certainly, the victim and children are disadvantaged by a system
that neither protects them nor affords an opportunity to gain at
least some small measure of healing from telling their stories and
witnessing the offenders being held accountable.
In an effort to avoid undermining the principle of no-fault dis-
solutions, many judges rule that domestic violence evidence is
inadmissible as it requires faultfinding and thus runs counter to
the intent of the doctrine.283  Such logic begs the question:  for
whom is it better to act as though the abuse did not occur?  Often
the victim’s healing process necessitates that the offender is held
responsible,284 but this is also essential for the batterer to get the
message of societal condemnation to increase the likelihood that
he will stop the abuse.  Some batterers contrive archaic and non-
sensical arguments in seeking to prevent the divorce from being
granted.  In In re Marriage of Haugh , the battering husband
claimed that because his wife had tolerated his outrageous be-
havior for a long time, she had effectively consented to remain in
the marriage forever.285  The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s analysis that evidence of the husband’s ruthless,
obsessive, and outrageous conduct toward his wife and six chil-
dren was sufficient to find the marriage irretrievably broken, and
that the wife’s previous tolerance of the abuse did not convey
consent to withstand it for all eternity.286
Some courts, however, have found that although their state
statutes omit specific reference to abuse as an enumerated factor
to consider, case law provides this option.287  Public policy argu-
ments attempting to justify nonadmission of fault evidence focus
on assumed benefits of including abuse within the “irretrievable
breakdown” rubric.  However, the rub in this framework is that a
283 See supra  notes 119 and 199 and accompanying text for further discussion of
statutory construction and case resolutions of this issue; see also  Naomi R. Cahn,
Civil Images of Battered Women:  The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Cus-
tody Decisions , 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1083-84 (1991) (discussing problematic im-
plications in custody suits).
284 See JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992).
285 978 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
286 Id .
287 See , e.g. , Love v. Love, 72 S.W.3d 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (finding marriage
irretrievably broken after wife testified that husband had been violent with her, had
repeatedly violated the restraining order and that she and the children were in fear
of him).
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large minority of states require that the couple wait two or three
years before a unilateral no-fault divorce can be obtained.288  The
divorcing spouses must live apart during this waiting period, un-
less they are proceeding by mutual agreement, or if the plaintiff
alleges the defendant is at fault.289  The emergence of no-fault is
further evidence of the court’s reluctance to interfere in
marriage.
Examining the public policy encouraged by no-fault divorce
laws290 leads to the unavoidable conclusion that its framework
must be modified to address the dangerous phenomenon of do-
mestic violence.  An informed analysis of no-fault, as imple-
mented today, reveals a good-faith attempt to address the
complex issues inherent in divorces.  Universal values include
those relishing family peace, which intimate violence obviously
destroys.  Thus, a one-size-fits-all approach to ending intimate re-
lationships blurs critical differences between couples who seek
legal release from unhappy, nonviolent marriages and those in
which abuse renders one party a victim who deserves to choose
the most appropriate legal remedy.  The distinction between abu-
sive versus nonabusive marriages is more than merely academic;
it defines the very nature of not only the relationship as it was,
but importantly for the court and the victim, how the abusive
spouse is likely to behave in the future.291  As such, there exists a
vast disconnect between the doctrine of no-fault and its intended
benefit for beleaguered spouses.
III
DOCTRINAL OBSTACLE OF BELIEF THAT EXISTING
LAWS ARE SUFFICIENT
A second doctrinal obstacle is that existing divorce laws pro-
vide a framework for addressing domestic violence in both con-
288 Mississippi, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee require consensual separation in
order to obtain a no-fault divorce. ELLMAN ET AL., supra  note 277, at 185-86. R
289 See , e.g. , MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.320 (West 2003) (stating grounds for divorce,
including consideration of five factors:  one year of separation with mutual agree-
ment; two years separation without agreement; adultery; abandonment; or respon-
dent’s behavior is intolerable).
290 See , e.g. , Laxton v. Laxton, 498 A.2d 909 (Pa. Super. 1985) (finding that when
a statute (here no-fault divorce) grants broad discretion to the trial court to strive
for justice and equality in its rulings, specific no-fault divorce procedures cannot be
avoided or ignored).
291 See  Adams, supra  note 74, at 166 (reporting that batterer’s past conduct is the R
most accurate predictor of his future conduct).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE303.txt unknown Seq: 55 24-MAR-05 10:46
Access to Meaningful Remedy 999
tested and uncontested cases involving dissolution, custody,
visitation, and division of property.  Thus, courts are likely to re-
sist any proposal that adds complexity to their already large
burden.
A. Premise that Torts Are Suspect in Divorce
Courts usually start from the premise that circumspection is
warranted when considering tort actions accompanying di-
vorce.292  Another concern often voiced is that of lying plain-
tiffs—women claiming to be battered in order to obtain
undeserved damages.  Empirical studies document, however, that
it is the perpetrators who are rarely truthful with those who have
the to power to hold them accountable.293  Additionally, when
batterers do admit to their crimes, they tend to minimize the se-
verity, frequency, and range of abuse.294  Importantly, context is
often excluded from both researchers’ and the courts’ evaluation
of violent episodes, resulting in too many women being charged
as perpetrators who are, in fact, acting in self-defense and are the
true victims.295  Perhaps uncomfortable for some to acknowl-
edge, the rigorous studies and most esteemed experts agree that
the vast majority of domestic violence is perpetrated by men
against women,296 and that it is actually rare for women reporting
such abuse to be lying.297  In fact, empirical data document that
292 See , e.g. , Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(stating that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims deserve cautious re-
view in the marital setting).
293 See , e.g. , Sarah L. Cook, Self-Reports of Sexual, Physical, and Nonphysical
Abuse Perpetration , 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 541, 562 (2002) (finding that
while a large number of incarcerated men were willing to disclose physical, sexual,
and nonphysical abuse to researchers, most had not done so with the criminal justice
system); Walter S. DeKeseredy & Martin D. Schwartz, Measuring the Extent of Wo-
man Abuse in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships:  A Critique of the Conflict Tactics
Scales , NAT’L RES. CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Feb. 1998 (finding that the most
common screening questions are limited in scope, allowing offenders to skew report-
ing), available at  http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/ Research/VAWnetDocs/
AR_ctscrit.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
294 See , e.g. , DeKeseredy & Schwartz, supra  note 294. R
295 Id . at 2 (reporting that while men generally use violence to control their part-
ners, women more often use it to defend themselves).
296 See , e.g. , Russell P. Dobash et al., The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital
Violence , 39 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 71 (1992) (finding that reports of equivalent abuse
by gender are false and reflect quite problematic research methodologies).
297 See, e.g. , People v. Colabine, No. C043187, 2004 WL 1616574 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 20, 2004) (citing the testimony of expert witness Linda Barnard explaining it is
untrue that battered women often lie about their abuse); see also  People v. Johnson,
No. C040781, 2003 WL 21235280 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2003) (citing expert’s state-
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most battered women dramatically under -report the abuse, and
when finally coming forward, often minimize the severity of the
harm.298
The argument typically advanced is that between statutory and
case law, sufficient tort remedies exist, the problem being that
lawyers do not properly utilize them.  But deficient attorney
practice cannot be examined in a vacuum, for the legislative pro-
cess and evolution of legal doctrine are so enmeshed as to pre-
clude scrutiny of one without inclusion of the others.  The courts’
and bar’s general distaste for handling family violence matters is
reflected in statutory and case language, and, importantly, formal
and informal requirements of victims prior to accessing remedies.
For example, the Harris County District Attorney’s Office in
Houston will not assist an abuse victim in obtaining a protective
order unless she has both left the batterer and sustained visible
injuries.  Rationalized as a screening device, it is contrary to the
Texas Family Code, which mandates a finding that family vio-
lence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future prior to the
issuance of a protective order.299
B. Problem of Timing and Rights:  Permissive vs. Mandatory
Joinder of Claims
1. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel300
At first glance it would appear that most states are permissive
regarding joinder of tort and divorce actions.  However, closer
scrutiny reveals that many divorce statutes include specific lan-
guage that, although joinder is not strictly mandatory, if the sub-
ject of the subsequent tort action was at all part of the
ment that the number of false reports of domestic violence is no more than for other
crimes); see also  Andrea M. Kovach, Prosecutorial Use of Other Act of Domestic
Violence for Propensity Purposes:  A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future , 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 1115, 1126 n.91 (discussing how the myth of domestic violence vic-
tims lying hurts victims’ credibility in court).
298 See  Alana Dunnigan, Comment, Restoring Power to the Powerless:  The Need
to Reform California’s Mandatory Mediation for Victims of Domestic Violence , 37
U.S.F. L. REV. 1031 (2003) (stating that many women minimize their experiences of
domestic violence); see also  Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the
Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases , 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2141 (1993)
(discussing victim’s minimization of abuse).
299 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.001 (Vernon 2004) (required findings and orders).
300 Res judicata includes both claim and issue preclusion, with some considering
the latter to be a modern term for collateral estoppel. See  Heacock v. Heacock, 520
N.E.2d 151, 152-53 (Mass. 1988).
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dissolution, the tort action will be disallowed on grounds of res
judicata.301  Missouri distinguishes between actions alleging fraud
or conversion—allowing them to be filed separately302—but not
most other claims, such as battery, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.303
Maine offers another permutation in specifying that joinder is
not required if the divorce proceeds on a no-fault basis, but oth-
erwise res judicata or collateral estoppel would likely bar a later
tort suit.304  Connecticut has decided that public policy favors
mandatory joinder of tort law with dissolutions.305  New Jersey
now requires joinder,306 as do New York307 and Ohio.308
States mandating joinder purport that fairness requires divorce
and tort actions to be resolved simultaneously, although others,
such as Tennessee309 and Texas,310 allow either joined or succes-
sive resolution of the claims.  Quite problematic, however, is that
even in states with permissive joinder, most divorce decrees in-
clude a stipulation that all matters between the parties have been
resolved, thus barring subsequent tort action.  In Stuart v. Stuart ,
a Wisconsin battered woman filed a tort action against her ex-
husband, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, as-
sault, and battery, just three months after her no-fault divorce
301 See, e.g. , Ex parte  Howle, 776 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 2001) (allowing summary judg-
ment for husband on tort action, as wife’s tort claim for husband’s violence was issue
raised in divorce and wife was compensated for it); see also Kemp v. Kemp, 723
S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming dismissal of wife’s assault and battery
tort suit, brought after the divorce, as the issue of his breaking her nose was raised in
the divorce and wife was compensated).
302 See, e.g. , Wood v. Wood, 716 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
303 It is beyond the scope of this Article to address in depth the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, but note that some states have recognized it.  For
example, New Hampshire does so, but imposes formidable restrictions on its use,
such as requiring physical manifestations as an essential element. See Corso v. Mer-
rill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979); see also Horwitz v. Horwitz, 16 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000).
304 See , e.g. , Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993).
305 See , e.g. , Hutchings v. Hutchings, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 498 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Feb. 22, 1993) (ruling that wife must join actions for divorce and tort).
306 See , e.g. , Mustilli v. Mustilli, 671 A.2d 653, 657 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995)
(stating that recent jurisprudence suggests that mandatory joinder is now the rule in
New Jersey).
307 See , e.g. , Partlow v. Kolupa, 504 N.Y.S.2d 870, (App. Div. 1986), aff’d  509
N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1987).
308 See , e.g. , Shelar v. Shelar, 910 F. Supp. 1307 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
309 See , e.g. , Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
310 See , e.g. , Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
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was granted.311  The ex-husband countered that since the divorce
judgment included language that “all assets, debts, and other
ramifications of the marriage” had been fully resolved, the ex-
wife should be barred from pursuing the tort claim since she
failed to notify him of her intent to file the tort claim.312  The trial
court ruled in favor of the ex-husband, finding it “absolutely un-
conscionable” that Ms. Stuart failed to notify the court of her
impending plans to file a civil action when negotiating her di-
vorce.313  Characterizing the case as frivolous, “an abuse of the
judicial system,” and “brought in bad faith and solely for the pur-
poses of harassment and malicious injury,” the court awarded
Mr. Stuart $10,000 in attorney fees.314
The appellate court, however, found that res judicata was not
applicable since the divorce case considered only the dissolution
and division of property, without addressing the bad behavior or
fault of either party, and concomitant compensatory or punitive
damages.315  Importantly, the court specifically noted that “di-
vorce and tort actions do not easily fit within the framework of a
single trial”; thus, the goals of res judicata would not be served
by insisting on joinder of both matters.316  Citing the fundamen-
tal unfairness of applying res judicata, the court noted that the
divorce action did not allow for full consideration of Ms. Stuart’s
tort claim.317  Similarly, the appellate court was unmoved by Mr.
Stuart’s claim of equitable estoppel, finding that “[f]ailing to dis-
close a potential tort claim cannot be interpreted as a representa-
tion that no such claim exists.”318  Finally, the court ruled that the
division of marital property was based on state law, negating Mr.
Stuart’s assertion that he was harmed by Ms. Stuart’s failure to
reveal her planned tort suit.319  The Wisconsin Supreme Court
311 See  Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
312 Id .  The ex-husband cited res judicata, equitable estoppel, and waiver as the
bases of his argument.
313 Id .
314 Id .
315 Id . at 635 (stating that “in making the financial allocation between the parties,
the court could not consider one spouse’s tortious conduct or, based upon that con-
duct, award the injured spouse punitive damages or compensatory damages for past
pain, suffering, and emotional distress”).
316 Id . (explaining that the objectives of res judicata are “judicial economy and
the conservation of those resources parties would expend in repeated and needless
litigation”).
317 Id . at 636.
318 Id .
319 Id .
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affirmed the appellate court’s reasoning,320 taking a more realis-
tic approach to the joinder quandary.
Some courts do not hold res judicata as a bar to a post-divorce
tort action,321 in some cases even if the harm on which the tort is
based was discussed in the dissolution proceedings.322  Their rea-
soning is premised on the belief that divorce and tort actions are
quite dissimilar.323  Although divorce is intended to legally dis-
solve a marriage and apportion support, alimony, and marital
property, tort is designed to compensate aggrieved parties in
damages.324  This distinction is critical to a court’s interpretation
of when to assert res judicata or collateral estoppel.325  The pur-
pose of alimony is to assist a spouse with financial support, and
the division of the marital estate is to reflect each spouse’s contri-
butions to the marriage.326  Thus, res judicata should not prevent
further tort claims, as the harmed spouse cannot obtain tort dam-
ages as part of the divorce decree even if the abusive behavior is
raised in that forum.  As distinct from a tort action, the dissolu-
320 Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. 1988).
321 See, e.g. , Vance v. Chandler, 597 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Heacock v.
Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988); Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909 (N.H.
1987); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah 1988).
322 See Noble , 761 P.2d at 1374 (ruling that even where divorce case addressed
wife’s lowered earning potential and increased living expenses due to injuries from
her husband intentionally shooting her, res judicata would not bar later tort claim);
see also Heacock , 520 N.E.2d at 153 (holding that since the record was silent as to
considering assaultive conduct in division of marital estate and alimony, res judicata
was not applicable).
323 See  Cater v. Cater, 846 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ark. 1993) (although wife was
awarded property and alimony in her divorce, tort claim for assault and battery was
not litigated and, therefore, is not barred by res judicata in later action); Vance v.
Chandler, 597 N.E.2d at 237 (although parties were the same, claims were not—thus
allowing woman to sue her ex-husband for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and civil conspiracy); Heacock, 520 N.E.2d at 153 (underlying claims of tort
and divorce are different, thus res judicata does not preclude wife’s subsequent tort
action); Slansky v. Slansky, 553 A.2d 152 (Vt. 1988) (wife cannot relitigate property
division settled in divorce, but decree does not preclude subsequent tort action on
different issues).
324 See Aubert , 529 A.2d at 912; see also Heacock , 520 N.E.2d at 153.
325 Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues already resolved in a prior
action involving the same parties, either based on judgment or issue preclusion. See
Arthur J. Spector, Bankruptcy , 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 563, 577-78 (explaining
collateral estoppel in the context of divorce proceedings); see also  Leonard Karp &
Laura C. Belleau, Litigating Domestic Emotional Distress Claims , FAIRSHARE, Mar.
1998, at 2, 5 (stating that “collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of
an issue determined in the divorce case where the same issues arise in the later tort
action.”)
326 See Heacock , 520 N.E.2d at 153.
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tion proceeding is designed neither to provide damages for the
harm nor to penalize the abusive spouse.327  In no-fault jurisdic-
tions, considerations of res judicata are intensified as the
tortfeasor’s conduct often cannot be raised in the divorce.328  At
least in fault states, there exists some basis for arguing that the
harm could have been raised in the divorce action,329 although
the victim’s fear of retaliation may prevent her from doing so at
that time.330
Some states, however, preclude plaintiffs from filing post-di-
vorce tort actions on the basis of res judicata, asserting that the
issues either were resolved in the dissolution proceeding or could
have been disposed of in that venue.331  Although the distinction
between divorce and tort appears to be clear, courts have incor-
rectly asserted res judicata to bar a quite different cause of action
than has already occurred.  In Kemp v. Kemp, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals invoked res judicata to preclude a battered
wife’s tort action because the husband had been ordered to pay
past and future medical bills as part of the divorce decree.332  Al-
though acknowledging that the two cases were different, the
court nonetheless found that payment of medical bills meant the
wife had “in effect . . . prevailed on a tort claim.”333  Adopting a
broad interpretation of res judicata, the Kemp  court stated,
“[P]rinciples of res judicata apply not only to issues actually
raised and finally adjudicated in prior litigation, but to all claims
and issues which were relevant and which could  reasonably have
been litigated in a prior action.”334  If the Kemp  court wishes to
establish a rule that all claims must be brought at one time, that
is wholly different than stating that the battered wife who only
received coverage of medical bills prevailed in her tort action
when no damages were assessed.335
327 Id .
328 See  Karp & Belleau, supra note 326, at 5. R
329 See Andrew Schepard, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res Judicata , 24 FAM.
L.Q. 127, 143 (1990).
330 See  Dalton, supra  note 16, at 364-69.
331 See , e.g. , Smith v. Smith, 530 So.2d 1389 (Ala. 1988) (plaintiff barred from
asserting post-divorce tort action on the grounds that she discussed the tortious inju-
ries in her divorce).
332 Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138, 139-40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), (cited in Dal-
ton, supra  note 17, at 378). R
333 Kemp , 723 S.W.2d at 139-40.
334 Id . (emphasis added).
335 Similarly, in Smith v. Smith , 530 So.2d 1389, 1391 (Ala. 1988), the battered
wife was barred from bringing a post-divorce tort action because coverage of her
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Such an approach has the potential to place abuse victims in a
precarious position.  As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted in
the Stuart  case, a res judicata bar would force an abused spouse
to make an unconscionable choice:  the spouse can “commence a
tort action during the marriage and possibly endure additional
abuse”; “join a tort claim in a divorce action and waive the right
to a jury trial on the tort claim”; or “commence an action to ter-
minate the marriage, forego the tort claim, and surrender the
right to recover damages arising from spousal abuse.”336  What
the Stuart  court understood—that the Kemp  court missed—is
that a battered woman may have myriad valid reasons for being
unable to assert the harm in the divorce action, ranging from fear
of retaliation to prioritizing acquisition of a job and new home to
low self-esteem and depression.337  But for the batterer’s egre-
gious abuse, the victim would not be in a disadvantaged position
in having to decide which claims to assert.  Certainly a manifest
injustice338 would occur if the batterer benefits from his tortious
conduct by being able to assert res judicata, although the victim
is left without equitable recovery.
These factors specific to domestic violence torts are virtually
ignored by the transactional approach imposed by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments’ requirement that, absent extenuat-
ing circumstances, all theories of claim and remedy arising from a
single transaction be asserted in a single action.339  Under this
theory, joinder is mandatory, as it assumes that the divorce and
tort actions emanate from one factual core—the marital relation-
ship.340  Others have challenged this assertion, arguing instead
that the demise of the marriage brings about the divorce, al-
though the harmful actions provide the basis for tort claims.341
New Jersey ascribes to the mandatory joinder rule, insisting that
medical bills and insurance had been part of the divorce discussions, and the court
had known that the husband’s violence had caused the ruptured disc for which she
needed surgery. Id . at 1390.
336 See  Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
337 See  Buel, supra  note 192.
338 Several states’ common law provides that res judicata cannot operate if mani-
fest injustice will occur. See  Yarnell v. City Roofing, Inc., 812 P.2d 1199, 1206 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1991), aff’d , 813 P.2d 1386 (Haw. 1991) (cited in Stacey A. Kawasaki, Inter-
spousal Torts: A Procedural Framework for Hawai’i , 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 377
(1997)).
339 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. C (1982).
340 See  Schepard, supra  note 329, at 131.
341 See  Janet W. Steverson, Interspousal Tort Claims in a Divorce Action in Ore-
gon , 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 757, 771-72 (1995).
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tort and divorce matters must be brought together if they derive
from or relate to “the same transactional circumstances.”342  This
doctrine was first espoused in dicta in Tevis v. Tevis , when the
court stated:
Since the circumstances of the marital tort and its potential for
money damages were relevant in the matrimonial proceedings,
the claim should not have been held in abeyance; it should,
under the “single controversy” doctrine, have been presented
in conjunction with [the divorce] action as part of the overall
dispute between the parties in order to lay at rest all their legal
differences in one proceeding and avoid the prolongation and
fractionalization of litigation.343
Although the single controversy doctrine may seem appealing
at first glance because of its apparent administrative efficiency,
even New Jersey courts have acknowledged that its application
may produce unjust results, warranting a departure.344  If counsel
is bringing a domestic violence tort action subsequent to divorce
in a single controversy doctrine state, she will want to be pre-
pared to argue those facts specific to her case that made limiting
the causes of action to one proceeding difficult or impossible.
2. Release Provisions Estopping Relief
In Stuart , the trial court ruled in favor of the ex-husband’s as-
sertion that subsequent tort action was precluded by the full re-
lease clause of his divorce decree, stating that “all assets, debts,
and other ramifications of the marriage” had been fully dis-
closed.345  In overruling the res judicata bar, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals did not specifically address this release clause,346 but
since the wife prevailed it can be assumed the court did not find
that it constituted a sufficient basis to deny her tort relief.  Flor-
ida courts have ruled that silence will not be construed as a
waiver, enforcing release clauses only so long as the language is
clear that future rights are being relinquished.347  It is thus unde-
342 See  Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29, 32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
343 Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (N.J. 1979).
344 Brown , 506 A.2d at 30.
345 Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
346 Id . at 632.
347 See , e.g. , Newsome v. Newsome, 456 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the agreement “must be specifically expressed by clear language evi-
dencing an intent to waive all such rights in the future”); see also  Ryland v. Ryland,
605 So.2d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding the couple’s settlement did not
refer to alimony or attorney’s fees, allowing the court to later consider them).
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termined whether Florida courts will permit post-divorce tort
claims if the issues have not been addressed in the divorce
judgment.348
Professor Clare Dalton cautions those representing abuse vic-
tims to refuse all-inclusive release provisions in divorce actions to
preserve their client’s right to pursue tort relief in the future.349
Dalton notes, however, that a victim’s aversion to the broad re-
lease may alert the batterer as to her later plans.  Even if a bat-
tered woman is aware of the pitfalls of a full disclosure provision,
she may feel compelled to acquiesce under duress.  The victim’s
realistic apprehension of retaliation should be sufficient for a
later court to find the release invalid due to its involuntariness.350
C. Problematic Mediation Mandates
The proliferation of mediation351 is problematic for battered
women on many fronts, but it is the mandatory provisions that
can prove most difficult for those wishing to seek remedies in
tort.  Administrative efficiency is one reason cited by courts for
their increasing use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in
family law matters,352 but this represents a shortsighted option in
many domestic violence matters as batterers often have no inten-
tion of abiding by the agreements, thus increasing the likelihood
that the cases will continually reappear.  However, mediation, as
the preferred ADR method, has become an integral part of fam-
ily law practice across the country, with some jurisdictions man-
dating mediation even in domestic violence cases.353  Largely due
to the efforts of battered women’s advocates, most states have
statutory or informal provisions allowing abuse victims to use
shuttle mediation or to opt out altogether, subsequent to a hear-
ing on the merits.  Although these provisions at least take into
consideration the likely danger of placing the victim and offender
in the same room, they usually offer only the illusion of an effec-
tive intervention.
348 See  Karp & Belleau, supra  note 325, at 5 (discussing res judicata generally).
349 Dalton, supra  note 17, at 382. R
350 Id . at 383.
351 Mediation is defined as a form of negotiation in which a trained third party
helps the litigating parties reach a voluntary settlement.  17 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative
Dispute Resolution  § 16 (1995).
352 See , e.g. , Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence
Cases , 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 235 (2002).
353 See , e.g ., Dunnigan, supra  note 298.
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One concern is that mediators are often not lawyers, and even
those who are may be unfamiliar with the premises of tort, the
nuances of causation, harm, continuing tort, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and the dynamics of domestic violence re-
lationships—thus denying the abuse victim’s right to be heard on
key claims.  Particularly in jurisdictions mandating joinder of tort
and dissolution claims, yet also in those requiring mediation for
contested matters, the victim loses the opportunity to present her
case to a learned judge and, hopefully, a jury of her peers.
A second problem is that of abusers not negotiating in good
faith, and since this is an essential underpinning of mediation, the
victim’s chances of achieving an equitable resolution and compli-
ance with the agreement are further minimized.  Thus, although
mediation is intended to reduce litigation costs and foster greater
harmony for the divorcing couple, the batterer ensures that
neither goal is achieved because his sense of entitlement means
he will not relinquish such power to the court.  Third, there is
every reason to believe the very power imbalance that character-
izes abusive relationships also carries over into mediation.  Some
jurisdictions do not allow lawyers to be present in the mediation
session or do not allow them to speak; often the batterer subtly
or overtly silences the victim with words, gestures, and looks that
may appear harmless to an outsider, but which have terrifying
meaning for the victim.
Fourth, some rules of mediation may be logical in a non-abuse
context, but their implementation in domestic violence cases can
sabotage the entire effort.  For example, “no interrupting” is a
typical rule that would appear to foster respectful listening on
both sides.  However, batterers are adept at taking control of list-
ing the issues to be discussed, framing the conflicts, and formulat-
ing solutions.  In one mediation session in which I was allowed to
sit but not speak, the batterer was permitted, for almost an hour,
to list all his grievances with the victim.  He alleged that, al-
though his wife worked full-time outside the home, was the pri-
mary caretaker for their two small daughters, and attended
secretarial classes at night, she was a prostitute, lousy house-
keeper, and “bad Christian” because she did not always get the
two- and four-year old daughters to church on Sundays.  When I
objected to this tirade as unfounded verbal abuse, irrelevant to
the custody case, the mediator informed me that each side was to
have uninterrupted time to speak.  My battered client cried
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throughout the batterer’s invective, as he got increasingly more
abusive, calling her a “slut, whore, and tramp,” which the media-
tor allowed, as long as he did not curse.  When the batterer rose
from his chair and came toward my client, I ushered her from the
session and back to the courtroom, where the judge admonished
us for being “uncooperative” with the mediation.
A fifth problem with mediation in divorce and tort matters is
the victim’s fear of retaliation for any negative information she
discloses about the batterer.  Although it might be assumed that
this would also be true with a tort claim, a vastly different frame-
work controls the case.  In a formal court hearing, the imprima-
tur of a robed judge, empanelled jury, court officer, rules of
evidence, and statutory and common law are all in place to pro-
vide both victim and offender the message that the case is being
treated seriously.  Sixth, mediation re-privatizes the abuse, al-
lowing the batterer to use its more therapeutic and communica-
tion-focused aspects to further manipulate the victim toward
inequitable resolutions.354  With much pressure on the mediator
and divorcing parties to reach an agreement, a coercive atmos-
phere is likely for the victim who desires not only safe transi-
tion,355 but also compensation for the harms inflicted by the
batterer.
Seventh, studies indicate that, to forge an effective resolution,
mediation must be voluntary and both parties must be committed
to implementing the agreement.356  The purpose of this is to en-
sure that litigants are entering into the process in good faith and
with the intention of implementing the agreement. In the court’s
quest for administrative efficiency, it may lose sight of these es-
sential components lacking in most domestic violence cases.  For
the foregoing reasons, mediation is often problematic for bat-
tered women seeking termination of dangerous marriages.  Fur-
ther, this trend toward ADR in family law forces the re-
privatization of domestic violence matters, thus hindering hard-
354 See generally  Andre R. Imbrogno, Note, Using ADR To Address Issues of
Public Concern:  Can ADR Become an Instrument for Social Oppression? , 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 855, 858 (1999).
355 Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence:  Analysis, Commentary
and Recommendations , 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 38 (1992).
356 Barbara J. Hart, Custody and Divorce Mediation , in FAMILY VIOLENCE DEP’T
OF THE NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MANAGING YOUR
DIVORCE:  A GUIDE FOR BATTERED WOMEN 9,  10-11 (1998).
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won gains to garner access to the courts.357
D. Disproportionate Distribution of the Marital Estate:
Inadequacy of Current Doctrine
Obstructed tort remedies might not incite such concern if dis-
proportionate division of property was used to provide some
measure of compensation for the harmed spouse, but such is not
often the case.  Largely based on judicial discretion, court rulings
differ widely.  Fault and no-fault categories are insufficient to de-
scribe the latitude in state policies when evaluating whether evi-
dence of misconduct will be factored into allocation of property
and alimony.  Some assert that fault cannot be part of the court’s
evaluation absent express statutory language to permit consider-
ing it, as that was the precise intent of no-fault legislation.358
Well over half the states adhere to no-fault doctrine in dividing
marital property, and about half do so in determining alimony.359
This is based on policy espousing that tort and criminal law are
the more appropriate vehicles for addressing fault, as the divorce
process would become distorted if forced to take on this issue.360
This social policy represents the admirable desire to simplify, ex-
pedite, and defuse divorce, but it also proves unrealistic and un-
duly burdensome for abuse victims.  Some states mandate that all
issues between the parties must be resolved in the divorce action,
thus precluding separate tort claims for those without the re-
sources for prolonged, separate litigation.  Additionally, the mar-
ital assets may not be large enough to warrant a separate tort
case, but if fault were considered in the process of dividing the
property, the harmed spouse could receive at least some
compensation.
Although New York’s no-fault divorce law includes a provision
assuming equitable distribution, some of its courts will not con-
sider abusive conduct by one spouse against another as a factor
when dividing marital property.361  In Orofino v. Orofino ,362 the
357 See  Krieger, supra  note 352 (arguing that mediation is a setback to the legisla-
tive and political progress of the battered women’s movement, in part by forcing
family law matters to be dealt with privately).
358 See , e.g. , In re  Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
359 The American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations , 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 59 (2001).
360 Id .
361 See , e.g. , Kellerman v. Kellerman, 590 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1992) (ruling
that twenty-seven separate incidents of abuse during a two-year marriage was not
sufficiently “egregious” to warrant unequal distribution of marital assets).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE303.txt unknown Seq: 67 24-MAR-05 10:46
Access to Meaningful Remedy 1011
defendant was found to have severely abused the plaintiff, in-
cluding threatening to commit arson and kill her, holding a gun
to her head, and, in one incident, lacerating her scalp after throw-
ing a glass ashtray at her.363  Nevertheless, the trial court ruled
that the defendant husband should not receive a reduced share in
a nearly two-million-dollar joint account/stock portfolio.364  In-
stead, the court gave the defendant sixty percent of the portfolio,
rationalizing that he was the sole manager of the assets and plain-
tiff’s only role was that of a “homemaker.”365  The Orofino  deci-
sion is contrary to the New York legislature’s express intent when
enacting its equitable distribution law:366  that marriage be
viewed as a partnership, giving value to the homemaker’s contri-
butions, and presuming a just division upon divorce.367
The focus on equity logically empowers courts to take into ac-
count reprehensible behavior of the parties when allocating mari-
tal property.368  And, although New York’s statute does not
include fault among its thirteen itemized factors, number thirteen
specifies that the court “shall consider . . . any other factor which
the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.”369  Even
with this provision, New York courts generally do not take into
consideration obvious fault by one party,370 explaining that “fault
362 627 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1995).
363 Id . at 461.
364 Id .
365 Id . at 462.
366 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 2003).
367 See  Price v. Price, 503 N.E.2d 684, 687 (N.Y. 1986):
The Equitable Distribution Law reflects an awareness that the economic
success of the partnership depends not only upon the respective financial
contributions of the partners, but also on a wide range of nonremunerated
services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and
providing the emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the other
spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home.
(citing Brennan v. Brennan, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (App. Div. 1984)); see also Mem-
orandum of Assemblyman Gordon W. Burrows , in NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
ANNUAL 129, 130 (1980) (“The basic premise for the marital property . . . reforms
. . . is that modern marriage should be viewed as a form of partnership.”).
368 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990) (“Equity—Justice adminis-
tered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules of com-
mon law . . . [t]he term equity denotes the spirit and habit of fairness, justness and
right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men.”).
369 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 2003)
370 See  Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1984) (ruling that
considering fault when dividing marital property would be contrary to legislative
intent); see also O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that deter-
mining fault would be too time-consuming for courts in the process of divorce).
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is very difficult to evaluate in the context of a marriage,” in part
because both parties’ conduct may be the problem.371  This rea-
soning is based on several erroneous assumptions, beginning with
the projection that the litigants may be equally culpable.  The
court has a duty to determine if one party is disproportionately at
fault, as is the case in most domestic violence situations.
Deeply troubling is the notion that if an issue is difficult, the
court can excuse itself from addressing it.  This is a puzzling posi-
tion for the court, given that determining fault and severity of
harm is precisely  its role, whether deciding business, family, or
estate conflicts.  Furthermore, triers of fact are presumed able to
determine level of fault, and, indeed, if it appears both parties
are equally culpable, the property can be divided to reflect that.
In first recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress,
courts responded to the concern that frivolous claims would pro-
liferate by noting that triers of fact are deemed capable of dis-
cerning “slight hurts” as opposed to “outrageous conduct.”372
Particularly if courts are averse to the filing of tort litigation in
the marital context, they cannot ethically bar all avenues of re-
dress simply because the cases are difficult.
Perhaps most worrisome is the courts’ reliance on the postula-
tion that marriage represents an economic partnership, and that,
somehow, this precludes consideration of fault when dividing
property.373  These are not mutually exclusive concepts: the court
can evaluate both  the economic partnership and  fault aspects of
the relationship, particularly because they are likely correlated.
Empirical studies have documented that many batterers employ
economic abuse and coercion as part of their obsessive control in
addition to the infliction of physical harm.374
Florida’s divorce law is premised on equity as well, with the
371 Blickstein , 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
372 See  Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. 1961) (finding that the defendant had
intentionally caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress by his “outrageous con-
duct” and that the court could ably differentiate that from a “slight hurt”).
373 O’Brien , 489 N.E.2d at 719.
374 See JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE:  BATTERED WOMEN, WELFARE, AND
POVERTY 22, 29-30, 46-50 (2000) (describing how economic abuse often increases
dependence on welfare, sabotages birth control efforts, and causes or exacerbates
substance abuse—all barriers to work and self-sufficiency); see also  LUNDY BAN-
CROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT?  INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY AND CONTROL-
LING MEN 8 (2002) (noting that batterers often use economic exploitation in
addition to many other forms of abuse); Buel, supra  note 189 (reporting “[f]inancial R
abuse is a common tactic of abusers . . . .  The batterer may control estate planning,
access to all financial records, as well as make all money decisions.”).
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factors for court consideration delineated by property distribu-
tion375 and alimony.376  Since neither statute includes fault or
damages for harmful conduct among its listed factors, case law
expressly prohibits consideration of fault unless the behavior de-
pleted marital assets.377  Other jurisdictions have ruled that legis-
lative silence can be interpreted as recognizing the necessity of
examining fault for the purposes of alimony and property divi-
sion.378  Interestingly, even though some statutes mandate that
courts continue to weigh fault solely for deciding issues of ali-
mony and property distribution, appellate courts have found that
reprehensible conduct was not properly considered by the trial
court.379
No state allows a spouse to recover both tort damages and a
larger share of the marital property, but courts can still award a
disproportionate share of the assets to one spouse for factors
other than tortious abuse.380  If the tort and divorce actions are
filed together, the factfinder can prevent double recovery simply
by considering the tort damages when deciding how to divide the
marital estate.381  However, in community property states, dam-
ages for personal injuries for IIED, including pain and suffering,
constitute the separate property of the harmed spouse, and are
not part of the marital assets to be divided by the court.382  Trial
courts possess immense discretion in distributing the marital as-
sets,383 with equality not being essential.384  The doctrinal obsta-
cles discussed herein attest to the overwhelming challenges
facing spouses wanting to use tort law in seeking remedies for
their harm.  It is thus an illusion that existing law is sufficient to
375 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1)(a)-(1)(j) (West 2004).
376 See id . § 61.08(2)(a)-(2)(g).
377 See , e.g. , Eckenrode v. Eckenrode, 570 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (ruling “[a] party’s misconduct is not a valid reason to award a disproportion-
ate amount of the marital assets to the innocent spouse, unless the infidelity de-
pleted the marital assets”).
378 See , e.g. , In re  Marriage of Galloway, 547 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); In
re  Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
379 Galloway , 547 S.W.2d at 193; Schulte , 546 S.W.2d at 41.
380 See  Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993).
381 Id .
382 See , e.g. , Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 264 (Tex. App. 2001) (citing Twyman ,
855 S.W.2d at 625 n.20, that “[s]uch a recovery does not add to the marital estate”).
383 See , e.g. , TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 1998); see also  Jacobs v. Ja-
cobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985).
384 See , e.g. , Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981) (describing the fac-
tors for courts to consider, including differences in income and earning ability, ages,
and benefit to harmed spouse had the marriage continued).
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address serious marital misconduct, for too often tort and family
law case precedent preclude recovery while the most blamewor-
thy batterer, who has caused the most harm, escapes
responsibility.
E. Underutilization of Prenuptial Agreements as Protection
Against Spousal Violence
Even with prenuptial agreements utilized more frequently by
prospective spouses, it is rare that counsel include provisions to
address potential physical violence or economic harms.385 Pos-
ner  indicated the courts’ recognition of spouses’ right to contract
as deserving of increased influence over the traditional, desig-
nated status model that advocated preservation of marriage, al-
most without exception.386  Although growing acceptance of
prenuptial agreements seemed likely to better protect battered
women, surprisingly few of the contracts even mention potential
violence, let alone emotional abuse.  Prior to Yankee coach Jack
Satter’s marrying manicurist Nancy Bernard, he wrote a prenup-
tial agreement she claimed to have signed without reading.387
Nancy asserted that the agreement should be ruled invalid be-
cause Jack had greatly undervalued his business interests.388  In
1991, the trial court ruled the agreement valid,389 after which
Jack argued that it should be deemed unenforceable because
385 See , e.g. , Nora Lockwood Tooher, Prenups Gaining In Popularity , LAW.
WKLY. USA, Jan. 19, 2004, at 3 (noting that most prenuptial agreements address
division of property, whether alimony will be provided, and protection of large
inheritances).
386 See  Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (stating that the court
knew “of no community or society in which . . . public policy . . . condemned a
husband and a wife to a lifetime of misery as an alternative to the opprobrium of
divorce”).
387 See Dateline NBC:  Dateline/Court TV Exclusive; Breaking Up Is Hard to Do,
Satter vs. Bernard Divorce  (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Dateline NBC], (cited in Michael T. Flannery, Affairs of the Heart , 10 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 211, 229 (2003), available at  2001 WL 24017844).
388 See  Satter v. Satter, 659 So. 2d 1185, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see also
Ex-Wife Settles Abuse Case , SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 1997, at 1B; Stephen Van
Drake, Extra-Inning Fight , BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Nov. 7, 2000, at A1;
Dateline NBC , supra  note 388 (the prenuptial agreement granted Nancy $1 million R
upon divorce, in addition to a Mercedes-Benz, a house in Cape Cod, and $1.5 mil-
lion when Jack died) (as cited in Flannery, supra note 388). R
389 See Satter , 659 So. 2d at 1185 (noting that the court awarded wife prejudgment
interest and required husband to transfer title of Cape Cod residence free of any
liens).  The court ruled that Jack was truthful about his worth and that Nancy had a
lawyer and an opportunity to read the prenuptial agreement. See Dateline NBC ,
supra  note 387.
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Nancy had breached by refusing to live with him.390  Nancy
claimed that Jack frequently beat and psychologically abused her,
as well as carried on affairs, thus driving her away.391
In a subsequent 1992 trial, the court ruled that Nancy’s testi-
mony regarding physical abuse was believable and that Jack had
violated the prenuptial agreement with his “systematic series of
mental abuses.”392  After intermittent further litigation,393 Nancy
filed a $10 million tort action against Jack for the physical and
emotional abuse he inflicted while they were married.394  A Flor-
ida judge found that the two-year statute of limitations precluded
consideration of all but one abuse claim.395  In less than an hour,
an all-male jury found that Nancy should not receive any com-
pensation,396 perhaps swayed by Jim Rice, Red Auerbach, Maury
Povich, and John Havlicek speaking on Jack’s behalf, and assert-
ing that he was “super.”397
IV
DOCTRINAL OBSTACLE OF PRIMACY OF STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS IN PERSONAL INJURY
TORT ACTIONS
A. Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations are often raised as an affirmative de-
fense, their purpose being to curb stale claims and endless worry
of being sued.398  They are rigidly enforced, with length and form
of activation varying by jurisdiction and type of claim, as well as
390 See Satter , 659 So. 2d at 1185.  The prenuptial agreement provided that “Nancy
shall not be entitled to receive anything if [she] cease[d] to cohabitate with Jack.”
Dateline NBC , supra  note 387.
391 See Dateline NBC , supra  note 387; see also  Gayle Fee & Laura Raposa, Ex
Puts $10M Bite on Hot Dog King , BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 18, 1993, at 8 (summariz-
ing Nancy’s testimony in Palm Beach Circuit Court).
392 See  Van Drake, supra  note 388.
393 Jack said he was not subject to the prenuptial agreement as Nancy had not
legally divorced her second husband.  However, the court ruled in Nancy’s favor.
See Dateline NBC , supra  note 388. R
394 See Dateline NBC , supra  note 388; see also  Gayle Fee & Laura Raposa, Satters R
Keep Slicing the Bologna , BOSTON HERALD, June 16, 1996, at 10 (reporting that
Nancy claimed Jack “tyrannized” and “threatened” her during their marriage).
395 See  Van Drake, supra  note 389. R
396 Id .
397 See Dateline NBC , supra  note 388; see also  Fee & Raposa, supra  note 395, at R
10 (Jack’s “high-powered pals” at the trial saying that Jack was “super”).
398 See , e.g. , Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 761 N.E.2d 175, 186-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
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whether a discovery rule covers commencement of the action.399
Some of the disagreement focuses on whether the limitations pe-
riod begins to run when the injury occurs or when the plaintiff
knows or should know a tort has been inflicted.400  Although
many of these cases involve some form of negligence, they are
equally applicable to intentional domestic violence torts, particu-
larly when a victim has a credible basis for being unaware that
the abuse constitutes a cognizable legal claim or that the injury
would be severe.  Just as in medical malpractice or other tort
claims, the full extent of the harm may not manifest or be appar-
ent within the statute of limitations.  Thus, in some jurisdictions
continuing tort doctrine has been applied as an exception to stat-
utes of limitations to stay the commencement of deadlines until
either the ongoing conduct has stopped, the last act has taken
place, or the plaintiff becomes aware of the entire scope of
harm.401
B. Continuing Tort as Rational Remedy in Domestic
Violence Cases
A continuing tort is one in which injurious conduct has re-
curred over a specific period of time, with each day constituting a
separate cause of action.402  Although continuing tort theory has
traditionally been applied in a business context,403 there is no
reason to forgo its extension to domestic violence cases.  In fact,
a 1938 Texas court ruled that a husband could avoid the limita-
tions period in a divorce proceeding because of the continuous
399 See DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 470 (2d
ed. 1998) (explaining that whether or not a discovery rule is employed, there is disa-
greement as to whether the time period begins to run when the injury occurs).
400 Id . (citing Lo v. Burke, 455 S.E.2d 9 (Va. 1995) (limitations period started
running when plaintiff’s cyst became cancerous, not when doctor failed to properly
interpret CAT scan)).
401 See , e.g. , Hyon Waste Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 574 N.E.2d 129,
132-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
402 See , e.g. , Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App. 1990), rev’d on other
grounds , 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
403 See , e.g. , City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 300 N.E.2d 331, 334
(Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (applying continuing tort theory in a case of tortious interference
with an owner’s use of property); see also  Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 761 N.E.2d 175, 187-
88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (describing the application of continuing torts to a workplace
sexual harassment case in which a course of outrageous conduct justifies a remedy
that a one-time occurrence might not); Creswell Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Scoggins, 39
S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (recognizing the tolling concept of continuing tort in
a trespass to land and nuisance case).
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nature of his wife’s cruel treatment.404 Continuing tort doctrine
prevents the defendant from asserting a statute of limitations de-
fense, and the court bases its liability determination on the cumu-
lative effect of all  the harmful conduct, not simply a single
incident or small cluster.405  Although in the usual personal in-
jury case, the harmful conduct is finished on a specific day and
the statute of limitations begins, in a continuing tort case the
cause of action continues and does not accrue until the tortious
conduct stops.406
The tolling of statutes of limitations is often necessary to facili-
tate battered women’s filing of tort actions because of the rela-
tively short time frames afforded by most states.  For example,
New York has a one-year statute of limitations on intentional
torts,407 making it extremely difficult for abuse victims to effect
timely filing due to their difficulty in marshalling all the resources
necessary to leave the abuser.  Policy considerations should allow
for tolling the statutes of limitations when a victim can show that
she was unable to file her tort claim while under the domination
of the abuser.  This position is consistent with the existing judicial
doctrine of estoppel to assert limitations.  Remedies expert and
law professor Douglas Laycock says that it is analogous to long-
standing statutory exceptions for plaintiffs in the military, out of
the country, mentally disabled, in prison, or who are otherwise
unable to assert timely claims.408  The doctrine is also supported
by the accrual rule on professional malpractice, where the statute
generally does not begin to run until the professional relationship
ceases.  The premise is that one cannot reasonably be expected to
take legal action against a fiduciary on whom one still relies.409
An increasing number of courts are recognizing continuing torts
in the context of domestic violence cases as a means of compen-
sating the victim for the full extent of harm.  In Feltmeier , the
Illinois Appellate Court held that a husband’s violent acts and
intentional infliction of emotional abuse constituted a continuing
404 See C.J.S. Limitations of Actions  § 177, at 231 (2004) [hereinafter C.J.S.]; see
also  Franzetti v. Franzetti, 120 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).  Interesting that
the doctrine is not applied in any of the cases in which wives were being battered by
their husbands.
405 Twyman , 790 S.W.2d at 819.
406 See C.J.S., supra  note 405, at 231. R
407 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3) (McKinney 1999).
408 E-mail from Douglas Laycock, University of Texas School of Law Professor,
(March 12, 2004) (on file with author).
409 Id .
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tort, thereby allowing the battered wife additional time in which
to file her claim.410  Citing section 46 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts,411 the Feltmeier  court noted that the extent and
brutality of the harm provided the battered wife with relief.412
In Giovine v. Giovine , a battered wife successfully sued her
husband in tort, alleging emotional and physical harm caused by
his continuous acts of abuse for the duration of their marriage.413
The Giovine court ruled that if an abused partner is determined
to have battered woman’s syndrome (BWS),414 she should be al-
lowed to sue her spouse for the emotional and physical torts he
committed against her throughout the marriage, “provided  there
is medical, psychiatric, or psychological expert testimony estab-
lishing that the wife was caused to have an ‘inability to take any
action to improve or alter the situation unilaterally.’”415  Thus, to
toll the statute of limitations, Giovine  affirmed a four-part test to
meet the standard for claiming BWS.  A victim must have (1)
participated in an intimate relationship that is either “marital or
marital-like”; (2) suffered psychological abuse committed by the
domineering partner over a prolonged period of time; (3) result-
ingly experienced recurrent psychological or physical harm for
the duration of the relationship; and (4) been unable to engage in
behavior to improve or change the situation unilaterally.416
The Giovine  court’s insistence that BWS dictate the parame-
ters of recovery imposes too rigorous a standard and one based
on highly controversial data.  BWS is not a defense, but rather a
pattern of symptoms describing the effects of abuse on the
victim.417
410 Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d 1032, 1040-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
411 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j at 77-78 (1965) (“Outrageous
Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress”) (noting that “[t]he intensity and the
duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity).
412 Feltmeier , 777 N.E.2d at 1043.
413 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
414 The term “battered woman’s syndrome” was coined by clinical psychologist
Lenore Walker to describe the response of abuse victims to the violence perpetrated
against them. See generally WALKER, supra  note 30.  Walker expanded this theory R
several years later. See LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME (1984).  She theorized that domestic violence occurs in cycles typified by
three phases:  tension building, explosive incident, and honeymoon. See id . at 126.
415 Giovine , 663 A.2d at 114 (quoting Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 794 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1994).
416 Giovine , 663 A.2d at 114.
417 See  Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Vio-
lence:  A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome , 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191
(1993).
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Initially hailed as a compelling tool to help battered women
explain the reasonableness of their behavior and state of mind,
BWS evidence may be misapplied and greatly harm victims who
may not fit its narrow descriptions.418  However, the Giovine
court does cite State v. Kelly  as recognizing BWS to explain that
an abuse victim may become hopeless when she cannot control
the violence, causing a form of psychological paralysis that makes
it extremely difficult to extricate herself from the relationship.419
Importantly, many victims do seek help, but are hampered by
shame and fear of the batterer’s retaliation.420
In Feltmeier,  the battered wife’s psychologist testified that the
victim suffered from BWS as a result of the “systematic, repeti-
tive infliction of psychological trauma” intended to “instill terror
and helplessness.”421  He also diagnosed her as having PTSD
caused by the entire pattern of abusive conduct, not just one inci-
dent.422  Public policy and equity considerations ought to dictate
that a batterer not be rewarded for inflicting such severe trauma
that the victim is unable to file a tort claim within the statute of
limitations.  The Cusseaux  court stated:
The mate who is responsible for creating the condition suf-
fered by the battered victim must be made to account for his
actions—all  of his actions.  Failure to allow affirmative recov-
ery under these circumstances would be tantamount to the
courts condoning the continued abusive treatment of women
in the domestic sphere.423
V
RECOGNITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS ITS
OWN TORT
A. Credibility, Empowerment, Necessity, and Fairness
The taxonomy of torts confers title to areas of practice with
sufficient specialization to warrant their own name.  In some in-
418 See  Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome:  Selling the Shadow to
Support the Substance , 38 HOW. L.J. 297, 301 (1995) (describing the troubling nature
of “battered woman jurisprudence, given its debasing female stereotyping which de-
scribes abused women as ‘suffering’ from the battered woman syndrome”).
419 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
420 Id .
421 Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 777 N.E.2d 1032, 1043 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (citing the
testimony of Mrs. Feltmeier’s psychologist, Dr. Michael E. Althoff).
422 Id . at 1043-44.
423 Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 794 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994).
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stances a creative legal framework is necessary to reform the le-
gal system’s ineffectiveness, as with the evolution of strict
products liability in response to uncompensated harmed consum-
ers.424  Victims of medical malpractice and environmental con-
taminants have successfully argued for tolling statutes of
limitations in those cases in which the harms become apparent
only long after the initial tortious conduct.425  Public policy argu-
ments buttress such doctrine in focusing on the premise that in-
jured plaintiffs should have a means of recourse, particularly
when the defendant is in a better position to control the poten-
tially harmful conduct than is the victim.426  Whether under the
rubric of intentional and economic torts or negligence and third
party liability, there exists a rich array of domestic violence legal
issues making clear the need for its own designation.
In addition to the credibility conferred by special designation,
domestic violence torts offer victims an empowering paradigm in
which to locate their harms.  Some victims know only that they
suffer depression, low self-esteem, and pain resulting from the
perpetrator’s abuse, but assume that previous poor responses
from the legal system will be repeated.  Upon learning that a de-
lineated category of tort is devoted specifically to the panoply of
their harms, victims may feel empowered to use the legal system
to hold their batterers accountable.
Necessity and fairness arguments also bolster support for a do-
mestic violence tort as present practices reflect rampant bias
against battered women asserting claims within the civil justice
system.427  Intimate partner violence reflects classic intentional
424 Dalton, supra  note 17, at 331. R
425 See , e.g. , Alex J. Grant, When Does the Clock Start Ticking?  Applying the
Statute of Limitations in Asbestos Property Damage Actions , 80 CORNELL L. REV.
695, 697 (1995) (noting that victims with latent diseases highlighted the inadequacy
of statutes of limitations that extinguished their claims before they could reasonably
have known they had been harmed); see also  Susan D. Glimcher, Statutes of Limita-
tions and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims:  An Exception or the Law , 43
U. PITT. L. REV. 501, 522 (1982) (stating “adoption of a discovery rule by judicial
decision or legislative enactment thus becomes merely a nominal concession to the
ever-increasing numbers of toxic substances victims”); Common Law Personal In-
jury Recovery , 99 HARV. L. REV. 1602, 1609 (1986) (warning that if courts reform
statutes of limitations to allow previously barred victims to recover, legislatures may
enact laws to protect the industrial tortfeasors).
426 See , e.g. , Judge Traynor’s persuasive concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. , 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944) (“[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inher-
ent in defective products that reach the market”).
427 See , e.g. , DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVOLVING ADULTS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, A
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torts, yet with a plethora of its own unique and complex facets.428
Innovations regarding statutes of limitations, continuing tort, and
strict liability exemplify the substantive importance of a specific
domestic violence tort.
Countering delineation of a domestic violence tort is the pro-
position that current law in some states already permits dispro-
portionate distribution of the marital estate as a means of
compensating a harmed spouse.  However, this option proves too
often to be meaningless as it places sole power of equitable rem-
edy within the purview of judges, some of whom will not consider
abusive conduct by one spouse against another as a factor when
dividing marital property.429  By joining the ranks of mass torts,
medical malpractice, toxic torts, and products liability, domestic
violence torts would properly be placed with their brethren, and
similarly increase the likelihood of holding batterers responsible
for their tortious acts.  Under the rubric of domestic violence
tort, abuse victims would more likely obtain economic redress,
whether or not the batterer is held criminally liable.
Another argument for recognition of domestic violence tort is
that law schools and continuing legal education programs would
be left with little option but to teach the subject.  The legal and
social challenges faced by battered women should inform the
scholarship and pedagogy of law.  Currently, many lawyers and
judges view domestic violence law as prosaic, although it is an
issue of profound social significance and, as it presents across a
spectrum of legal matters, will likely impact their professional
and personal lives.430  It is not surprising, then, that many attor-
REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMM’N ON GENDER BIAS
IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM [hereinafter GEORGIA COMM’N ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM REPORT] at 3 (August 1991) (stating that some of the most com-
pelling evidence reflected large numbers of women denied civil and criminal reme-
dies by the courts, with gender biased attitudes “pervasive in the judicial system’s
handling of domestic violence cases”), available at  http://www2.state.ga.us/courts/
supreme/ceadults.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
428 See supra  notes 17-25 and accompanying text for description of the full spec-
trum of harms.
429 See supra  notes 361-84 and accompanying text for fuller discussion of cases
and issues on this topic.
430 See ABA COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE (Deborah Goelman et al. eds., 1996) (including
chapters covering the relevance for most fields of law, including Children’s; Civil
Rights; Contracts; Corporate; Criminal; Elder; Employment; Evidence; General
Practice; Health Care; Government and Public Sector; Housing and Homelessness;
Insurance; Judiciary; Law Firm Management; Legal Services; Mediation; Military;
Poverty; Probate, Estate and Trust; Professional Responsibility and Ethics; Real
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neys, ignorant of domestic violence issues, mishandle the full
spectrum of its legal applications, including potential tort mat-
ters.  The American Bar Association’s Commission on Domestic
Violence reports that, overwhelmingly, the technical assistance
calls they receive indicate that abuse victims are not receiving
adequate representation.431
States’ gender bias reports, including The Gender Bias Task
Force of Texas, Final Report , verify that improper handling, at all
levels of the legal system, can be traced to attorneys’ lack of
knowledge about domestic violence.432  Gender bias reports also
demonstrated a dire need for continuing legal education pro-
grams for judges, as some of their statements indicated beliefs
that domestic violence is a private, family matter that should not
be brought before the court, that many victims provoke the
abuse, that the victim would leave if the harm were severe
enough, and that a man may punish his wife for undesirable be-
havior.433  Such biased notions and deficient education on the is-
sue can have catastrophic consequences for the parties
involved.434
The argument that recognition of a new tort will encourage
specious claims has been raised in response to proposals for
other torts, such as IIED.  Typical of appellate courts’ answers to
this assertion is that of the Seventh Circuit in Eckenrode v. Life
of America Insurance Co. :  “As to the reason that recognizing
the ‘new tort’ would lead to frivolous claims, the court observed
that triers of fact from their own experiences would be able to
Property; Safety Planning; Screening; Sexual Harassment; Solo Practitioners; Sports
and Entertainment; State and Local Government; Tax; Trial Practice and Torts).
431 See ABA COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WHEN WILL THEY EVER
LEARN?  EDUCATING TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  A LAW SCHOOL REPORT I-5
(Deborah Goelman & Roberta Valente eds., 1997) available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/etedv/etedvpdf.pdf (last visited Mar. 14,
2005).
432 SUPREME CT. OF TEX., GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE OF TEXAS, FINAL REPORT
(1995).
433 See , e.g. , GEORGIA COMM’N ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM RE-
PORT, supra  note 428, at 4. R
434 For example, a Maryland battered woman was murdered by her partner after a
judge denied her a protective order.  Civil Protective Order Transcript, Petitioner
Helen Jenkins, District Court of Maryland, Prince George’s County, Maryland, 1993
(as cited in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EDUCATION IN LAW SCHOOLS, A REPORT BY THE
ABA’S COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (2002)).  In another case, a judge gave
custody to a father who had not only battered the child’s mother, but also had a
conviction for his previous wife’s murder.  Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla.
App. 1996).
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draw a line between ‘slight hurts’ and ‘outrageous conduct.’”435
Although Eckenrode  is an insurance company bad faith case, the
same elements of IIED must be proved in domestic violence
torts asserting IIED claims.436
B. Legislative Remedies
An indication that cultural norms are gradually shifting toward
a more accepting view of tort litigation against batterers can be
seen in recently enacted statutes specifically recognizing a vic-
tim’s right to pursue civil remedies.  The legislative findings ac-
companying California’s law state that the pervasiveness of
domestic violence warrants availability of such tort actions “in
order to underscore society’s condemnation of these acts, to en-
sure complete recovery to victims, and to impose significant fi-
nancial consequences upon perpetrators.”437  The substantive
portion of the law provides for tort liability if the abuse is perpe-
trated by a domestic partner,438 and for the award of general,
special, and/or punitive damages,439 in addition to “equitable re-
lief, an injunction, costs, and any other relief that the court
deems proper, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”440
The Illinois Gender Violence Act provides a civil cause of ac-
tion for injunctive relief, actual and punitive damages, attorney’s
fees, costs, or other remedies deemed appropriate against a per-
petrator.441  The statute defines gender-related violence as a
form of sex discrimination and includes one or more acts of phys-
ical aggression (at least in part committed because of the victim’s
435 470 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1972).
436 Most courts have recognized four elements of IIED. See, e.g. , Fletcher v.
Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88 (Ct. App. 1970) (citing (1) outra-
geous conduct by the defendant; (2) defendant’s intent to cause or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe suffering or extreme emo-
tional distress by the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant’s conduct as the proximate or
actual cause of the emotional distress).
437 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6, 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 193 § 1 (West 2004) (The findings
also include “(b) These acts merit special consideration as torts, because the ele-
ments of trust, physical proximity, and emotional intimacy necessary to domestic
relationships in a healthy society makes participants in those relationships particu-
larly vulnerable to physical attack by their partners”).
438 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6(a) (West 2004).
439 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6(b) (West 2004).
440 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6(c) (West 2004).
441 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/10, 82/15 (West 2003) (perpetrating includes
either “personally committing the gender-related violence or personally encouraging
or assisting the act or acts of gender-related violence”).
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gender), sexual assault, and threats, but irrespective of whether
criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction have resulted.442
Actions claiming physical violence or sexual assault must be
brought within seven years, although claims based on threats of
such offenses must be filed within two years of the cause of ac-
tion accruing.443  The statute’s preamble provides counsel and
judges alike with clear indication of its legislative intent to serve
not only as a remedy for past wrongs on an individual basis, but
also to recognize the systemic failure to adequately protect abuse
victims:
WHEREAS, Recent national studies demonstrate that wo-
men in the United States continue to be greatly harmed by
gender-related violence such as domestic violence, which is
disproportionately visited upon women by men, and sexual
abuse, which harms many women and children without being
reported or prosecuted; and
WHEREAS, It is documented that existing State and federal
laws have not provided adequate remedies to women survi-
vors of domestic violence and sexual abuse; and
WHEREAS, Women survivors of domestic violence often-
times have found laws against domestic violence used against
them by their batterers; and
WHEREAS, The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
the states alone have the authority to grant civil relief to the
survivors of such sexually discriminatory violence; and
WHEREAS, Such acts of gender-related violence are a form
of sex discrimination . . . .444
Rhode Island has promulgated more limited legislation regard-
ing such torts, denoting the availability of damages recovery in
civil actions brought by stalking victims.445  Virginia, too, speci-
fies only stalking as a cause of action giving rise to compensatory
442 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/5.
443 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/20 (specifying that if the victim is a minor at the
time of the offenses, the action must be brought either within seven years or two
years after the person turns eighteen).
444 2003 ILL. LAWS 416.
445 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-2.1(a) (2004).  Rhode Island uses the following
definitions:
(1) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series
of acts over a period of time, evidencing a continuity of purpose.  Constitu-
tionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of
conduct.”  (2) “Harasses” means following a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or
bothers the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose.  The course of
conduct must be of a kind that would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, or be in fear of bodily injury.
Id . § 9-1-2.1(b).
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and punitive damages, as well as costs, adding that the perpetra-
tor need not have been charged or convicted of the offense.446
However, given the frequency with which batterers stalk their
victims in tandem with other crimes, counsel should have ample
room to either utilize these statutes or argue that their intended
purpose is to prevent harm, easily covering physical violence,
sexual assault, and threats.
1. Include Judgment as Part of Alimony Order
Since collecting tort judgments can be problematic, one idea is
for judges to include the award within the alimony order.  This
suggestion does not require a reconceptualization of alimony’s
purpose, but rather a clarification that it is intended to effect the
equitable financial settlement of a divorcing couple.447  Since ali-
mony is not dischargeable in bankruptcy,448 inclusion of the tort
award adds some measure of protection against the unscrupulous
batterer who might otherwise use bankruptcy law to avoid pay-
ment.  International bankruptcy law expert Jay Westbrook cau-
tions, however, that federal bankruptcy courts look at alimony or
property awards through the lens of federal purposes for nondis-
chargeability and are free to re-characterize it as appropriate.
Thus, a state order might label the tort payment part of a prop-
erty settlement and hold that is it really alimony for priority and
discharge purposes.449  Rather than leave such an important task
wholly within the purview of individual courts, Professor West-
446 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-42.3 (Michie 2004) (defining a victim as one placed in
reasonable fear of death, sexual assault, or bodily injury to herself or a minor child,
and also specifying that the cause of action must be brought no more than two years
after the most recent offense.).
447 See The American Law Institute, supra note 359, at 24-25 (stating that
“[g]rounding compensatory awards on a principle of loss yields a conceptual refor-
mulation that helps explain generally prevailing practices” in alimony distribution).
448 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West 2004) specifies that a debtor is not discharged
from any debt
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separa-
tion agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record,
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a govern-
mental unit, or property settlement agreement.
449 E-mail from Jay Westbrook, University of Texas School of Law Professor
(March 10, 2004) (on file with author).  Professor Westbrook notes that particularly
in a state such as Texas, which has been hostile to alimony awards, the tort payment
may be deemed part of a property settlement. Id .
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE303.txt unknown Seq: 82 24-MAR-05 10:46
1026 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
brook further suggests amending the Bankruptcy Code to better
protect abuse victims who have secured tort judgments.
2. Amend Bankruptcy Code to Prevent Dischargeability
The Bankruptcy Code prohibits dischargeablility of some
nineteen categories of debt, including those incurred because the
debtor was driving while intoxicated,450 for fraud committed
while acting as a fiduciary,451 and for payment of restitution or-
dered under title 18 of the United States Code.452  Arguably, a
tort judgment rendered as part of a divorce could already be cov-
ered by § 523(a)(15), which includes within its purview of non-
dischargeable debts those “incurred by the debtor in the course
of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of re-
cord.”453  Further, a compensatory debt owed a crime victim is
not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing if it is catego-
rized as arising from “willful and malicious injury.”454  A Chapter
13 filing similarly excludes from discharge any orders for restitu-
tion and criminal fines.455
Although these provisions are a good start, I propose amend-
ing the Bankruptcy Code to codify that tort damages awards are
not dischargeable for many of the same policy reasons as the
nineteen categories currently listed:  those who would intention-
ally subvert the payment of debts should not be able to shield
themselves from accountability by fraudulently declaring bank-
ruptcy.  Westbrook states, “[i]f liabilities arising from drunk driv-
ing can make that list, domestic violence tort certainly has an
argument with Congress.  Given the evolution of social attitudes
450 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(9) (West 2004) states that a debt cannot be discharged if
for “death or personal injuy caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle if
such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol,
a drug, or another substance.”
451 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(4) (West 2004) (specifying nondischargeability if debt is
“for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or
larceny”).
452 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(13) (West 2004) (specifying nondischargeability “for any
payment of an order of restitution issued under title 18, United States Code”).
453 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(15) (West 2004).
454 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6) (West 2004) (providing that a debt survives bank-
ruptcy proceedings if it is based upon “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity”).
455 See  11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a)(3) (West 2004) (specifying that Chapter 13 superdis-
charge will not apply to restitution or criminal fines).
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on this point, I would think there would be a real shot.”456
C. Retaliation Concerns
This proposed amendment is consistent with other federal leg-
islation designed to ensure that restitution to crime victims is
non-dischargeable.  The 1994 Violence Against Women Act man-
dates that domestic violence offenders pay restitution subsequent
to a guilty plea or conviction.457  In the 1996 Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MVRA), Congress specified that federal and
state restitution liens are neither dischargeable under the Bank-
ruptcy Code nor voidable in bankruptcy proceedings.458  Addi-
tionally, a MVRA lien for the United States must be given the
same status as a perfected Internal Revenue Service tax lien,459
allowing it to be enforced against property that otherwise would
be ineligible under state law to become part of the bankruptcy
estate.460  Given that court orders for restitution, criminal fines,
and divorce-based tort awards survive bankruptcy discharge, it is
reasonable to add crime victims’ tort judgments to this list.
In order to be truly effective, the new amendment must also
mandate that a victim’s restitution and tort awards receive prior-
ity status within the Bankruptcy Code.  Currently, restitution,
fines, and tort awards are all classified as unsecured claims,461
and as such, the likelihood of recovery is greatly reduced.462
Since it is unlikely abuse victims can obtain the status of secured
creditors,463 they at least ought to be accorded priority standing
456 E-mail from Jay Westbrook, supra  note 450.  Professor Westbrook teaches R
bankruptcy law at the University of Texas School of Law.
457 See  Craig A. Gargotta, The Enforceability of Restitution Liens Under
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act , AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2002, at 8.
458 See  18 U.S.C.A. § 3613(e) (West 2004) (describing that MVRA restitution
liens are not dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings).
459 See  18 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c) (West 2004).  Federal tax liens are deemed priority
claims under § 507(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.
460 See  11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 2004).  By giving an MVRA lien the same
status as a tax lien, the bankruptcy estate is permitted to succeed the debtor’s legal
and equitable interests although a state law may have exempted or not defined the
substantive rights of these interests.
461 See BRIAN A. BLUM, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR:  EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 525 (1999) (explaining that the secured creditors are permitted to
recover to the amount of the collateral); see also  11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West 2004).
462 See BLUM, supra  note 462, at 381 (describing the typicality of general un- R
secured liens receiving minimal or no payment given their low ranking of priority).
463 A secured creditor is one who had obtained the debtor’s personal guarantee to
pay through a property lien, and thus, is given priority status over those without such
security. BLUM, supra note 462, at 525. R
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among unsecured creditors.  The Bankruptcy Code needs a statu-
tory addition, not only because the current piecemeal approach is
confusing, but also because some courts are not properly imple-
menting even existing provisions.
In In re Bennett , the bankruptcy court found that restitution
liens in favor of the federal government will not be given prece-
dence because § 1613 of the Bankruptcy Code does not specify
that an MVRA lien be afforded the same status as an unsecured
tax claim.464  The United States argued that because the benefac-
tors are crime victims, the restitution lien should be granted pri-
ority; the court responded only with convoluted reasoning that
prioritizing restitution liens would “victimize” other unsecured
creditors since the reduced distribution would, in effect, force
them to contribute to the debtors’s criminal sanctions.465  The
Bennett  court’s interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of
the MVRA statute and explicit legislative intent to provide an
effective enforcement mechanism for liens arising from MVRA
victim restitution liens.  Codification of domestic violence and
other crime victims’ heightened status within the hierarchy of un-
secured creditors is essential to fulfill the legislative intent and
the goal of equitable resolution in tort litigation against batterers.
Victims’ fear of retaliation is persistent precisely because so
many batterers make good on their threats.466  Counsel and sur-
vivors alike must be on guard, for it has proven quite difficult to
predict any given batterer’s response to the ending of the rela-
tionship and the filing of divorce, tort, protective order, or any
other legal action.467  Case law and scholarship abound with doc-
umentation of both the constant fear of retaliation voiced by vic-
tims, and the typicality of batterers making good on their
threats.468  Abusers need not retaliate solely with violence to be
464 237 B.R. 918, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that section 1613 defines the
procedures for enforcement of liens that have arisen under MVRA).
465 Id . at 923-24 (stating that innocent creditors should not be required to pay for
a debtor’s criminal sanctions).
466 See  Fleury et al., supra  note 63; see also  Adams, supra  note 73; Nora Lock-
wood Tooher, Judge Orders Ankle Monitor Company To Compensate Shooting Vic-
tim’s Family , LAW. WKLY. USA, Nov. 10, 2003, at 23 (describing how Joseph
Whitlow promised he would kill his ex-girlfriend for leaving him, and did so at the
first opportunity).
467 See  Adams, supra  note 73; see also  Dalton, supra  note 17, at 364-69. R
468 See , e.g. , State v. Rabago, 81 P.3d 1151 (Haw. 2003) (noting that Penal Code
§ 288.5 addresses course of conduct crimes, focusing on “a series of acts occurring
over a substantial period of time, generally on the same victim and generally result-
ing in cumulative injury,” and that as with intimate partner violence and child abuse,
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effective in deterring their victims, for some are quite adept at
“financial warfare,” such as transferring all funds in joint bank
accounts to their private accounts, or engaging in protracted liti-
gation to deplete all the victim’s resources.469  Former Seattle Po-
lice Chief Norm Stamper, a thirty-four-year veteran officer,
provides insight into the dangers of retaliation:
Many breathe a sigh of relief when the victim of domestic vio-
lence leaves her partner.  Cops, and often the victims, know
better.  Whether it’s Anna Quindlen’s fictional character in
her very realistic Black and Blue  or the many women I’ve seen
in tragically nonfiction situations, the most dangerous moment
in the relationship is usually when the batterer realizes it’s
over.470
With regard to joinder, some commentators indicate that re-
quiring abuse victims to file tort claims with the divorce may trig-
ger dangerous retaliatory conduct by the batterer.471  Others
have suggested that since tort actions do not address the victim’s
physical safety, they may simply antagonize the offender enough
to increase the abuse.472  However, this stance presumes that
counsel and advocates will not be involved in ongoing, short- and
long-term safety planning with the survivor, and underscores the
need to prepare her for possible retaliation.473  Additionally, Pro-
fessor Merle Weiner responds that this argument is weak: “[A]
successful suit for damages teaches the abuser that violent behav-
the victims “‘are likely to be unwilling to report their abuse to the authorities due to
fear of physical and/or emotional retaliation’ by the abuser”); see also  Rhonda L.
Kohler, Comment, The Battered Woman and Tort Law:  A New Approach to Fight-
ing Domestic Violence , 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1992) (“Many women do
not report instances of abuse because they are afraid to call the police or seek assis-
tance out of cultural, family or religious pressure, fear of retaliation or lack of pro-
tection by the police.”).
469 See, e.g. , Naomi Stern, Battered by the System:  How Advocates Against Do-
mestic Vilence Have Improved Victims’ Access to Child Support and TANF , 14 HAS-
TINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 55 (2003) (“Retaliation in the context of domestic violence
also may include forms of ‘financial warfare’ against a mother who pursues a divorce
or child support action.).
470 E-mail from Norm Stamper, former Seattle Police Chief (Mar. 10, 2004) (on
file with author).
471 See  Schepard, supra  note 330, at 133 (“Requiring a brutalized spouse to assert R
a claim for tort for harm inflicted during the marriage in a divorce action, some fear,
may simply enrage the abuser more and cause the wife more harm.”).
472 See  Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins At Home:  Let’s Stop Punishing Victims
and Perpetuating Violence , 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 271 (1987) (stating that a
damage award is not an optimal option as initiating these cases is likely to make the
abusers angry and trigger more abuse).
473 See supra  note 67 and accompanying text.
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ior comes only at the money cost of the damage done,”474 and
that “[o]ne of the most effective ways to stop domestic violence is
to make clear to abusers and potential abusers that society will
not tolerate it.”475
As should be the case in the practice of law, the client should
make the ultimate decision as to whether she wishes to proceed
with any potential claims, given the pros and cons are fully ex-
plained by counsel.  The hope is that although there may be an
initial spike in abuse immediately following the filing of legal ac-
tions, the batterer will quickly view the prospect of impending
sanctions as disincentive to continue.476  Whether the abuser
ceases his retaliatory abuse often hinges on the response of the
legal and law enforcement community.
Since 1999, I have worked with a battered mother of four chil-
dren, Nina Olivo, whose ex-husband, Jimmy Saldivar, has ad-
eptly employed a vast array of terrorizing strategies, most of
which either just skirt the law or make it difficult to prove he is
the perpetrator.477  Jimmy Saldivar has (1) killed two of his chil-
dren’s dogs—slashing one of their throats and shooting the other,
then leaving them for the children to find just outside the back
door; (2) poured ketchup on and stabbed stuffed animals, and
left them on Ms. Olivo’s lawn; (3) repeatedly smashed the wind-
shield and slashed the tires on her car; (4) stalked her by follow-
ing her car too closely, bumping it on the highway—narrowly
avoiding accidents with the children in her vehicle; (5) often
driven very slowly past her house at all hours of the day and
night; (6) repeatedly called the police to report that Ms. Olivo is
harassing him or his girlfriend, when Ms. Olivo is elsewhere;478
(7) enlisted the aid of his family and friends to call Ms. Olivo
474 Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage , 54
MD. L. REV. 183, 191 n.20 (1995) (citing Clark, supra  note 473, at 281). R
475 Weiner, supra note 474, at 191 n.20 (citing Clark, supra note 472, at 279).
476 See , e.g. , Weiner, supra note 474, at 191 n.20 (stating that “while the filing of a
case may escalate the abuse initially, at some point the existence of the cause of
action should serve as a general deterrent”).
477 Marie Nina Olivo has asked that she and her ex-husband, Jimmy Saldivar, be
identified to enable anyone wishing to view her case files to do so, as her case repre-
sents much of what is wrong with the court’s response to family violence victims and
their children.
478 For example, on September 10, 2003, Jimmy Saldivar and his girlfriend called
the Caldwell County Sheriff’s Department to report that Ms. Olivo was harassing
them.  However, at the time of the alleged harassment, Ms. Olivo was speaking to
my Domestic Violence and the Law class, some twenty-five miles away.  Rather than
investigate the history, a sheriff’s deputy called Ms. Olivo and demanded that she
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with thinly veiled threats to “get her” if she ever calls the police;
(8) put the children in danger by leaving them in a busy freight
trucking yard rather than the office where Ms. Olivo worked; (9)
refused to pay child support, though admitting that he lives at
home with his parents, drives a new truck, works full-time, and
has spent more than $8,000 on his lawyer’s fees;479 (10) caused
Ms. Olivo to be fired from at least four jobs because of his har-
assment and frightening behavior;480 (11) beaten his then sixteen-
year-old daughter so badly that she was hospitalized for two
days;481 (12) repeatedly driven past his son’s bus stop and
schoolyard, though ordered by the court to stay away from him;
and (13) continually threatened Ms. Olivo, her elderly mother,
and their children that if he ever goes to jail, they “will pay.”
And this is by no means a complete list.482
Perhaps some of this conduct does not strike the non-victim as
fearsome behavior, but all of it is designed to make clear he is
watching her every move and unwilling to relinquish control of
his ex-wife and children, thereby causing them to live in constant
fear.483  It is this pervasive, all-encompassing form of abuse that
tort actions may effectively address, particularly when the family
and criminal courts either refuse or are unable to do so, as has
cease her harassment.  Many of my outraged students and I wrote to the sheriff to
document her alibi, but none have received a response.
479 I was present in child support court on December 6, 2002, when Jimmy
Saldivar admitted these financial facts to Judge Dulce Madrigal.  Jimmy Saldivar
owes Ms. Olivo close to $20,000 in unpaid child support, but seems to have the
sympathy of the court, as he is not forced to comply with federal and state child
support enforcement laws.
480 Most of the employers have been willing to write a letter stating that Ms. Olivo
was an exemplary employee, but that her ex-husband’s conduct forced them to let
her go. See, e.g. , Letter from Standard Trucking to Ms. Olivo (Sept. 4, 1995) (on file
with the author).
481 There are medical records and photographs depicting large, purple bruises all
over Rebecca’s body on file with the author.
482 At my request, Ms. Olivo has kept a notebook documenting many more of
Jimmy Saldivar’s unlawful and threatening acts; this has proven helpful in obtaining
minimal assistance from the court.
483 For example, after one of his teachers stated that the fifteen-year-old son,
Jimmy Alan, was falling asleep in class, I asked him what the problem was.  He
stated to me that he heard on television that most crime happens from 2 a.m. to 5
a.m., and he wanted to be awake then to protect his mother and younger siblings if
his father came to their home.  Statement to the author on Sept. 14, 2003 in Austin,
Texas; see also  Nancy Worcester, Women’s Use of Force , 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WO-
MEN 1390, 1397 (2002) (quoting a survivor saying, “I probably only got hurt once a
year for twenty years, but I woke up every one of those other 364 days of the year
wondering if that would be the day.”).
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happened in Ms. Olivo’s case.  Contempt actions may appear as a
more expeditious option than the filing of tort claims, but the two
are not mutually exclusive.  Additionally, when the criminal,
family, and child support courts are unwilling to enforce their
own court orders, the option of a comprehensive tort action may
spur their recognition of the enormity of the batterer’s entire his-
tory of abusive conduct rather than their usual determination
which considers only the most recent incident.  In Ms. Olivo’s
case, her ex-husband has, for the past several months, abated his
abusive behavior after we suggested possible tort action to his
lawyer, and initiated correspondence with the recalcitrant law en-
forcement agencies and court.  As in every case, we employ an
array of coercive strategies and hope that at least one serves as a
deterrent.
D. A Recommendation for the Courts
Many judges’ misguided handling of domestic violence di-
vorces greatly increases the courts’ workload, primarily because
these judges are allowing the batterers to dictate policy.  Several
progressive judges have initiated “rocket dockets”484 to expedite
case handling of domestic violence matters, meaning that either
side must have a very good reason to obtain a postponement.
Former San Antonio Judge Bill White instituted this procedure
in his domestic violence court with stunning results—more vic-
tims followed through with prosecution and fewer batterers ap-
peared on the trial date without their lawyers.485  If judges are
truly interested in decreasing their workloads, they must be will-
ing to take a tough stance with batterers who repeatedly request
continuances, whether because they appear in court without
counsel, have failed to assist their attorneys to such an extent
that they must withdraw, or state they are simply dissatisfied with
counsel.  It is puzzling that judges express frustration with such
antics, yet appear unwilling to disallow them.
CONCLUSION
Scant attention has been paid to the deeply embedded doctri-
nal obstacles that must be remedied if abuse victims are to have
the same full access as other aggrieved tort victims.  It is hoped
484 See generally  Nora Lockwood Tooher, Rocket Dockets Speed Civil Trials ,
LAW. WKLY. USA, 2003.
485 Telephone interview with Judge Bill White (Jan. 16, 2003).
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this contextual analysis of three significant obstacles—the court’s
reluctance to interfere in marriages, the assumption that existing
law is sufficient, and the primacy of statutes of limitations—af-
fords a normative construct for reform.  To varying degrees, the
functions of tort law—corrective justice, deterrence, compensa-
tion, and redress for social grievances—are consistent with the
goals of domestic violence legal interventions.  Legislative intent
specifies abuse prevention as the priority of the many statutory
provisions in every state, thus mandating victim safety as a pre-
requisite to gaining any measure of intended remedy.  These pro-
posals do not call for radical, wholesale reform of tort doctrine,
but rather a refinement of existing frameworks for all the com-
pelling reasons discussed above.  If these adjustments can be
made, a powerful message will be relayed from the courts regard-
ing societal condemnation of intimate partner abuse—one that
adds legitimacy to torts doctrine and its use.
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